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Abstract
Rapid development of sensor technology has led to applications ranging from
academic to military in a short time span. These tiny sensors are deployed in environments
where security for data or hardware cannot be guaranteed. Due to resource constraints,
traditional security schemes cannot be directly applied. Unfortunately, due to minimal or
no communication security schemes, the data, link and the sensor node can be easily
tampered by intruder attacks.
       This dissertation presents a security framework applied to a sensor network that can
be managed by a cohesive sensor manager. A simple framework that can support security
based on situation assessment is best suited for chaotic and harsh environments. The
objective of this research is designing an evolutionary algorithm with controllable
parameters to solve existing and new security threats in a heterogeneous communication
network. An in-depth analysis of the different threats and the security measures applied
considering the resource constrained network is explored. Any framework works best, if
the correlated or orthogonal performance parameters are carefully considered based on
system goals and functions. Hence, a trade-off between the different performance
parameters based on weights from partially ordered sets is applied to satisfy application
specific requirements and security measures. 
The proposed novel framework controls heterogeneous sensor network requirements,
and balance the resources optimally and efficiently while communicating securely using a
multi-objection function. In addition, the framework can measure the affect of single or
combined denial of service attacks and also predict new attacks under both cooperative
and non-cooperative sensor nodes. The cognitive intuition of the framework is evaluated
under different simulated real time scenarios such as Health-care monitoring, Emergency
Responder, VANET, Biometric security access system, and Battlefield monitoring. 
The proposed three-tiered Cognitive Security Framework is capable of performing
situation assessment and performs the appropriate security measures to maintain
reliability and security of the system. The first tier of the proposed framework, a cross-
layer cognitive security protocol defends the communication link between nodes during
denial-of-Service attacks by re-routing data through secure nodes. The cognitive nature of
the protocol balances resources and security making optimal decisions to obtain reachable
and reliable solutions. The versatility and robustness of the protocol is justified by the
results obtained in simulating health-care and emergency responder applications under
Sybil and Wormhole attacks. The protocol considers metrics from each layer of the
network model to obtain an optimal and feasible resource efficient solution. 
In the second tier, the emergent behavior of the protocol is further extended to mine
information from the nodes to defend the network against denial-of-service attack using
Bayesian models. The jammer attack is considered the most vulnerable attack, and
therefore simulated vehicular ad-hoc network is experimented with varied types of
jammer. Classification of the jammer under various attack scenarios is formulated to
predict the genuineness of the attacks on the sensor nodes using receiver operating
characteristics. In addition to detecting the jammer attack, a simple technique of locating
the jammer under cooperative nodes is implemented. This feature enables the network in
isolating the jammer or the reputation of node is affected, thus removing the malicious
node from participating in future routes. 
Finally, a intrusion detection system using ‘bait’ architecture is analyzed where
resources is traded-off for the sake of security due to sensitivity of the application. The
architecture strategically enables ant agents to detect and track the intruders threatening
the network. The proposed framework is evaluated based on accuracy and speed of
intrusion detection before the network is compromised. This process of detecting the
intrusion earlier helps learn future attacks, but also serves as a defense countermeasure.
The simulated scenarios of this dissertation show that Cognitive Security Framework is
best suited for both homogeneous and heterogeneous sensor networks.
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Introduction
“Research is formalized curiosity. It is poking and prying with a purpose.” - Zora
Neale Hurston 
This dissertation presents a security framework applied to a sensor network that can be
managed by a cohesive sensor manager. The objective of this research is designing an evo-
lutionary algorithm with controllable parameters to solve many security threats in a het-
erogeneous communication network. The performance of a sensor network is evaluated by
efficient and reliable communication between the sensor nodes under adverse environ-
ments. This chapter stresses the importance of sensor network in our day-to-day life, and
discusses the network’s limitations. The performance of any application is based on the
cost, reliability, efficiency and accuracy of the system, thus implementing an apt frame-
work ensures longevity and security of the sensors. The proposed framework can be tai-
lored to the sensor’s resource availability and hence, can be used for applications using
homogenous and heterogeneous nodes. 
1. 1  Sensor Network
The evolution of sensor technology has a tremendous impact in the new millennia. The
need to monitor, sense, track information in different environments using cost-efficient
2communication had lead to exploration of every layer of the sensor architecture. There are
different types of sensors such as pressure, seismic sensor, heartbeat monitor, etc. The sen-
sor types implemented are primarily dependent on the application or user requirements. In
wireless sensor network (WSN), sensor nodes made of radio frequency (RF) communica-
tion links are deployed over a vast area. There are ongoing research on optimal deploy-
ment of sensor nodes[1, 2] assuming that the sensors are homogeneous and thousand of
sensors are deployed. The tiny, inexpensive sensors have limited memory and functional-
ity given the fact that the batteries(y) have limited power supply. The functionality of the
node is to sense, collect and distribute the dynamic information from one sensor node to
another. The important characteristics of a sensor network is scalability and reliability, as
more than thousands of nodes can be deployed. The sensors deployed under harsh envi-
ronmental conditions, are affected by electromagnetic interference (EMI) and thus com-
municating uncorrupted and secure messages without delay in a lossy wireless medium
becomes essential. 
1. 2  Limitations: Sensor Network
The traditional issues of a wireless network are energy conservation, bandwidth, data
rate requirements, stability, scalability, QoS, real-time adaptation, location awareness, reli-
ability, mobility and cost. Whereas wireless sensor node is limited to two main resources
namely, energy and bandwidth. Energy consumption plays a key role on the survivability
(lifetime) of sensors [3]. Performance of an application is mainly based on the system
requirements, the following characteristics of a network directly hinders the performance
parameters chosen. 
31.2.1  Network Architecture
There are different ways of modeling a network, such as hierarchical, cluster-based,
distributed and hybrid. In some applications sensor nodes act in a distributive manner
without any centralized control such as, Fire detection, Evacuation plans etc, where the
occurrence of an event is triggered based on its priority. The distributive architecture
would enable parallel communication but also might lead to redundant packets (mes-
sages), hence optimal message transmission is required. This type of architecture is best
used in applications where time constraint of messages is the primary concern, such as
Health monitoring, Disaster Evacuation, etc.
In a Hierarchal architecture [4] the communications between nodes are carried in an
orderly manner. The base station or a monitoring system queries to any region of interest
and receives responses from the nodes. In a hierarchal architecture, applications that
require central processing with decision making abilities, in some cases human interven-
tion is required. Applications such as Traffic monitoring system, Building monitoring sys-
tem, Maintenance applications i.e., Gas pipeline repairs, Windmill repairs etc. 
In a Cluster-based architecture [5] every region is partitioned such that each has a clus-
ter-head (CH), which aggregates the data and acts as the relay node for transmitting infor-
mation, thus saving energy. These cluster-heads are frequently updated to ensure lifetime
of the sensors. The process of choosing a cluster-head requires communication and syn-
chronization between peer nodes, thus leading to energy consumption. Cluster-based
architecture is best suited for applications that are data driven such as Biometric Identifi-
cation system, Traffic Monitoring system, etc.
4A Hybrid architecture [6] is one which is a combination of any of the above. In recent
research, a combination of event based and data driven applications are used, for e.g., in
Air traffic monitoring system, there is a huge amount of flight information used which
needs to be fused and also events such as terrorist attack comes along, then emergency
facilities needs to be accounted. Thus an architecture of a network changes is one of the
parameters that would affect the performance of the system. 
1.2.2  Deployment
In practice, deploying a sensor network in a hostile environment is done by random
distribution or Gaussian distribution [7]. Therefore, it is difficult to know the apriori topol-
ogy of sensor networks. In such cases, an approximation is made regarding the location of
the sensors. There are many localization techniques proposed, such as Multilateration[9],
Signal strength approach, etc., Since the exact location of a sensor is hard to estimate, any
security threats occurred due to denial of service attack such as a Sybil attack cannot be
identified. There are various methods of establishing encryption keys within neighboring
nodes are used for securing the links, which is out of the scope of this thesis. Deployment
and locating the sensors is an important aspect of any application.
1.2.3  Characteristic of Sensor Node
The characteristics of a sensor has major impact on the parameter settings of an appli-
cation. The tiny sensors by nature have energy constraints, limited memory and are band-
width deprived; hence a better knowledge on sensor’s characteristics helps in building a
highly robust and competitive application performance. 
51.2.3.1  Energy Availability
Need for tiny sensors has lead to power restrictions on the devices used to built a sen-
sor node and has also driven the cost. These sensors are small in size and are battery oper-
ated, therefore have limited capabilities. These sensor nodes can be used to relay messages
and require neighboring sensors to communicate messages to distant base stations or des-
tination nodes. As the sensors are deployed in hostile environments, replacement of batter-
ies is not an option. Typically sensors consumes energy even when they are switch from
sleep to active mode, hence each state of a sensor will contribute towards energy dissipa-
tion. Therefore, minimal usage of power can ensure the lifetime of the sensors. 
1.2.3.2  Memory (Computation Power)
The reduced size of the sensors with limited power source also denotes computation
constraints. In many cases, the sensors not only act as relay nodes but also fuse data to
make optimal decisions, under these circumstances computation power used by any
source is of great concern.
1.2.3.3  Adaptivity
There can be multitude of sensors deployed in a vast area, due to their limited power
supply many sensors fail to perform in any stage of the application. The network perfor-
mance should not be degraded due to any sensor failure such as technical faults, energy
scarcity, malicious behavior, etc. Thus a good adaptable protocol design which is fre-
quently updated with the current network topology would be best suited for a network
deployment in harsh environments.
61.2.3.4  Scalability and Reliability
Any network needs to be scalable, for e.g., after initial deployment if the necessity
arises for more sensors in a network, then the existing network structure should be able to
accommodate newcomers (sensors). The process of adapting to the nature of the network
by protocols is best suited for any application. A reliable communication is when the
nodes communicate any message to the destined nodes with minimal interrogations from
neighboring nodes. A equally weighted scalable and reliable network increases the perfor-
mance of a sensor network application. 
1.2.4  Security
One of the major concern of any wireless network is ‘Security’. Due to the above men-
tioned characteristics and limitations of sensor resources, traditional security schemes
such as public key infrastructure (PKI) and cryptography cannot be directly applied. Any
commercial or military application such as health monitoring and border protection
involves time and data sensitive information communicated over public wireless medium.
This information attracts intruders both to posses and falsify information that can lead to
catastrophic events and human casualties. Thus securing network using minimal and
energy efficient schemes without jeopardizing the network performance adds a layer of
complexity to the existing problem. 
1. 3  Wireless Sensor Network Applications
“Wireless Sensor Network is a boon to both industry and academia”. Current research
in technology has increased the production of wireless devices with reduced cost and bet-
ter performance that can be applicable to very large network with minimal human interfer-
7ence. The following examples gives a brief knowledge of the investments made in
implementing wireless sensor network (WSN) in real time projects.
1.3.1  Applications - Industrial
Intel Research is working with the academia in exploring the challenges faced by sen-
sor network. Deployment of WSN to monitor the health of semiconductor fabrication
equipment is underway. Another application known as IrisNet is an architecture and sys-
tem for a worldwide sensor web. It is modelled to help drivers locate available parking
spaces near their destination. One other application by Proactive Health research lab in
Intel is to conduct home heath care and aging-in-place technologies, which improves peo-
ple’s health by reducing nation’s overwhelming healthcare bill. 
Many Oil and gas companies are analyzing and developing WSN technology to
increase production, streamline operations and reduce expenses. It is estimated that the oil
industry would spend $200 million on WSN over the next three years, according to ON
World. The largest multinational oil and gas companies are pilot testing mesh WSN using
IEEE 802.15.4 radios. Monitoring the progress and maintenance repairs are the tedious
and most time consuming job, by implementing WSN, the revenue of this industry could
be increased.
Boeing, Endevco and Georgia Tech built a smart sensor based devices to measure
pressure distribution across the surface of an airplane wing. The project is underway and
still in its stages of implementing techniques for successful smart sensor network technol-
ogy. 
81.3.2  Applications - Academia
AWAIRS [10] is a project developed as a joint effort by UCLA and, Rockwell Science
center. The network protocols and cooperative processing algorithms are incorporated to
perform flexible tasks as small unit operations preserving energy and performance. The
main goal of AWAIRS is to attack power management in all areas by trading off system
performance.
Wireless Integrated Network Sensors (WINS) [11] has been developed by UCLA and
Rockwell Science center. WINS is a commercial project, developed based on the MEMS
technology with an embedded sensing intelligence. 
Smart Dust [12, 13] (Autonomous Sensing and Communication in a Cubic Millimeter)
is developed by U.C.Berkeley. It is used for both commercial and academic purposes. The
Smart Dust project demonstrates the integration of sensors and communications into a
cubic millimeter packed system. This involves both evolutionary and revolutionary
advances in miniaturization, integration, and energy management. 
A remote ecological network called PODS is built to investigate localized growth of
endangered species of plants by University of Hawaii. MAC layer technique is based on
802.11b and Bluetooth, while the network protocol developed is Multi-Path On-demand
routing (MOR). The data collected by the sensors consist of both weather and image, and
can be accessed by users via Internet. 
In MIT, WSN is applied for Environmental Monitoring in the Boston Botanical Gar-
den [14]. CodeBlue is a scalable software infrastructure developed by Harvard University,
where wireless medical sensors are used for medical care including pre-hospital and in-
hospital emergency care, disaster response and stroke patient rehabilitation [15]. 
9There are several sensor based applications in their developmental, demonstration or
production stages that are very data sensitive where security of the data, network and the
application is of great concern.
1. 4  Limitations & Security Challenges: Sensor Network
Security is a major concern that are seldom researched during the design phase of a
protocol. Therefore, any new security approach should be compatible with both existing
and upcoming protocols and technology. The following limitations and challenges faced
by sensor networks,
1. Sensors have limited energy, bandwidth, computing power and memory.
2. Sensor have no physical tamper resistance.
3. Network can be deployed in harsh environments or unsupervised conditions.
4. Sensor share information using unreliable or open unsecure wireless medium.
5. The functionality of a sensor node varies with time i.e. sensing, computing, routing
and idle.
6. Heavy security computation cannot be performed at the node i.e. security certifi-
cates and verification.
1. 5  Research Motivation
Routing algorithms are the backbone for data flow from source to destination while
maximizing global network performance. Unfortunately, due to minimal or no communi-
cation security schemes, the data, link and the sensor node can be easily tampered by
intruder attacks. Since, traditional security protocols are application dependent, they can-
not be applied for sensors that are limited in resources. Also, security framework should
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be adaptive, reliable, scalable, resource and time sensitive while being independent of the
network architecture and application. Unfortunately, protocols works best if they are tai-
lored for a particular application. Hence, the need for security framework that is versatile,
de-centralized and self-organized is immediate. A framework that can be customized for
applications with minimal changes in controllable parameters to ensure user and applica-
tion security is critical for day to day adoption.   
1. 6  Research Contribution
The new era of commercial and military applications require heterogeneous network.
Hence, a simple framework that can support security based on situation assessment is best
suited for chaos and harsh environment. The simulated scenarios of this dissertation show
that Cognitive Security Framework (CSF) is best suited for both homogeneous and hetero-
geneous sensor networks. Any framework works best, if the correlated or orthogonal per-
formance parameters are carefully considered based on system goals and functions. The
contribution of this dissertation is as follows,
1. Security vulnerabilities faced in every layer of sensor network. 
2. A survey on the different security defense mechanism proposed by researchers for
sensor based network.
3. The evolution of Cognitive Intelligence, which combines three major concepts Ant
Colony Optimization, Partially Ordered Sets and Bayesian Network. 
4. Design ‘Cognitive Security Framework’ (CSF) that can ensure security by adapting
based on network type, architecture and application requirements.
The proposed, CSF is de-centralized, robust, self-organized, scalable and independent
of application and network architecture. The level of security can be tailored based on user
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and network requirements using controllable performance parameters. The CSF is
designed to secure a network as follows:
1. Defend against Cross-layer Denial-Of-Service attack for existing protocols,
2. Detect and predict intruder attacks using sensor’s attributes, using Bayesian net-
work, and
3. Trace and isolate attacker based on intruder behavioral patterns using ‘bait’ archite-
cure.
The energy efficient cross-layer cognitive security protocol (C2SP) defends communi-
cation link between nodes during Denial-of-Service attack by re-routing data through
secure nodes. Develop a resource-aware feature in C2SP that enables data confidentiality,
authenticity, integrity and authorization using simple features of the node. Develop a
framework based on application cost and time that analyses behavior traits of intruder and
traces using low and high ‘bait’ interactions. The dynamic nature of CSF makes it robust
and suitable for applications where passive and active attackers are involved. The effi-
ciency and optimality of proposed CSF is analyzed based on the quality-of-service (QoS),
reliability, reduced false intruder detection rate and response time under varied security
threats and harsh environmental conditions. 
1. 7  Dissertation Structure
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses the
security vulnerabilities such as Denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, intrusion and anomaly
threats that affects the efficiency and reliability of any sensor based application. The pro-
posed Cognitive Security Framework (CSF) consists of three folds, in Chapter 3, the
cross-layer cognitive security protocol (C2SP) that acts as a defense mechanism against
12
single or multiple DoS attack is explained using Health monitoring and Emergency
Responder application, where heterogeneous links are used. In addition, the C2SP has the
ability to store information for future analysis, and can be utilized using data mining tech-
niques. The feature of Bayesian Network as a feedback in the C2SP to predict attacks
using security metrics is explained in Chapter 4. Bayesian based approach is applied on
vehicular ad-hoc network to verify the performance and relibability of the algorithm by
identifying the jammer DoS attack and also locating the jammer using multiple observa-
tions. The final phase of CSF, which predicts and traces intruders based on their behav-
ioral patterns for applications, where cost and security is uncompromisable using ‘bait’
architecture is explained in Chapter 5. The battlefield monitoring application is simulated
to evaluate the performace of the proposed approach. In addition, the the validity of the
attack and the ability to detect new DoS attack is also discussed. The three-fold framework
is presented with application-specific simulations that emphasizes the outcome of security
measures taken to attain better network performance. Chapter 6 concludes with research
analysis and the possible extension of the proposed framework to any future application
specific security problems.
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CHAPTER
TWO
Sensor Network Security
“Security when best applied is an application’s medallion, otherwise an adversary’s
wit”
Unfortunately, many sensor network systems developed so far have lacked security
during their initial design phase, paving way for researchers to interpret various intruder
actions and security breaches that reduced system and application performance. Unlike
traditional wired networks, modern nano-technology networks require security at each
stage of communications. A single attack could jeopardize partial or full coverage in any
network. Hence, an in-depth knowledge of the application system, hardware and software
helps in designing appropriate and efficient security measures. In this chapter, various
attacks that can be carried out in a heterogeneous sensor network are summarized, and
existing approaches to securing sensor network and their limitations are discussed.
Although each idea presented is a solution given a set of assumptions, the common end
goal is avoiding an application from catastrophic breach by adversaries. 
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2. 1  Sensor Network Security
There are several research work conducted in field of security ever since the develop-
ment of networks, but they cannot be directly applied to sensor network due to their
resource constraint. A security solution should be scalable, adaptable, reliable, and
resource efficient irrespective of deployment and environment. The security measures are
based on entities such as,
1, Data (Information) security, 
2. Network security and 
3. Application security. 
 
Figure 2.1. Three entity of Heterogeneous Sensor Security
A security framework that can accommodate threats from all the above areas as shown
in Figure 2.1 and adapt to all environment is rarely found. Recent development in technol-
ogy has led to a new era of heterogeneous networks, where resource-constraint nodes and
Information Network
Application
SECURITY
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pre-existing nodes needs to co-exist. In this chapter, we analyze all three aspect of security
threats with respect to wireless sensor, wired and mobile nodes. 
2. 2  Data Security
Data security is the fundamental concern of any application. Since, wireless network
uses RF links to communicate between nodes, data is sensitive to attacks caused by envi-
ronment, insider and outsider attacks. The four basic means of protecting data that existed
in traditional wired and modern wireless network are Confidentiality, Integrity, Authoriza-
tion and Authentication and in short termed as CIAA. Apart from these four, ‘data fresh-
ness’, ‘reliability’ and ‘availability’, vital attributes of sensor network is also included.
2.2.1  Confidentiality
The process of ensuring the data is accessible and relayed only by reliable and reputa-
ble nodes or user is called confidentiality. In applications such as emergency responder,
Fire detection etc., data shared by radio through the wireless medium is highly sensitive
and requires encryption. Since, sensor network are often used for mission critical applica-
tions, recharging batteries may not be an option. Hence, traditional public key cryptogra-
phy or tedious complex security schemes cannot be used directly and require simple
solutions. 
2.2.2  Integrity
Data integrity ensures tamper-resistant from malicious nodes. Since, sensor network
are deployed in open and harsh environment, the integrity of data sensed is constantly
scrutinized and tested. 
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2.2.3  Authorization
In this process, a node is authorized to send information across the network when
requested by a base station or user. This method of data authorization indirectly reflects a
hierarchical structure within the network, and is mostly found in sensor based mesh net-
work. Unfortunately, there are a few shortcomings in this authorization process, such as
the difficulty in maintaining authorization for continuously growing network. 
2.2.4  Authentication
The source node during information transmission authenticates its data, which assures
the originators identity and integrity and reduces tampering when relayed to sink node. A
message is authenticated using reusable message authentication code or other schemes at
each hop or a cluster of node depending on the application. 
2.2.5  Data Freshness
An important feature of sensor network is data freshness. Therefore, any scheme
should ensure both resource efficiency and high response time, as sensor based applica-
tions are also time sensitive. Any delayed data is not valued in sensor based applications,
thus a time-stamp that relates to data freshness is used, which also helps in sensor localiza-
tion. 
2.2.6  Reliability
Data reliability is an important aspect of the information collect from various nodes in
a network. Due to environmental conditions such as scattering, dust, walls, rain, heat, etc
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sensed and transmitted data become unreliable. Thus, methods used to obtain reliable data
is vital for applications where heterogeneous network is involved, as it affects overall
application performance. 
2.2.7  Availability
Data or information needs to be available to all nodes and users that are deemed legiti-
mate and hence it closely relates to authorization. But, if the participating node has
resource availability, the data when requested needs to be transmitted from source to desti-
nation. Therefore, a sensor’s service or reputation is based on the number of times its data
is made available to the genuine user to the total number of message transmission request. 
Data security is a challenging task for heterogeneous networks as proposed schemes
should be adaptable for all environments and maintain system performance. Also, the fea-
tures of data security discussed above require tailoring for the sensor network due to
resource constraints. 
2. 3  Network Security
Modulation, coding, routing protocols, medium access control (MAC) protocols and
localization algorithms designed for sensor networks directly contributes to resource
availability and application performance. The shortcomings of security schemes has led to
attacks such as Denial-of-Service (DoS), intruder attacks, privacy and identity thefts.
Another major concern in sensor network is identifying if a node is genuinely under
attack. As nodes can either deplete its resources or become unavailable, this can be misin-
terpreted as being under attack. Thus, evaluating and maintaining sensor’s resources and
security claims ensures the application’s longevity and reliability. 
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2.3.1  Denial-Of-Service Attacks
DoS attack occurs when a node is deprived of its service to the application irrespective
of resource availability. DoS attacks can easily affect both sensor and network perfor-
mance if one or more sensors are compromised. There are several types of DoS attacks
such as jamming, collision, black hole, etc as shown in Figure 2.2. Sensors are more vul-
nerable to single and combined DoS attacks, for example a worm-hole and flooding attack
when combined can lead to misleading information and packet loss. Thus, genuine nodes
that constantly attempt to transmit data unaware of its neighbors current status can lead to
resource exploitation. There are many concerns that arise from DoS attacks, such as 
1. Sensor’s quality of service
2. Application’s response time 
3. Node’s resource availability
4. Insider/ Outsider attack
5. Application/Sensor downtime
Physical Layer
Data Link Layer
Network Layer
Transport Layer
Session Layer
Presentation Layer
Application Layer
Modulation (Jamming)
Error Correction & Coding
(Collision, Exhaustion and Unfair-
ness)
Routing (Misdirection, Homing
and BlackHole)
Protocol (Flooding and Desyn-
chronization)
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Figure 2.2. Denial of Service Attack on Sensor Network Layer 
Hence, protocols or methodologies applied to detect DoS attack need to consider
node’s status to better judge if its under attack or has depleted its resources. The different
layers of the sensor network’s Open System Interconnection (OSI) model that can be
affected by DoS attack are physical, MAC, routing, and transport layer. Figure 2.2 associ-
ates the type of attack that occur and the OSI sensor network layer [16, 17]. The blocks
that are shaded in stripes can be eliminated, as it primarily depends on the kind of protocol
that is used for sensor network.
2.3.1.1  Physical Layer
Nodes of heterogeneous networks are a combination of wired, and wireless communi-
cation, but limitations exist in terms of energy and bandwidth. In the physical layer, ‘jam-
ming’ attack occurs due to multiple sources of radio frequency (RF) interference that can
be both unintentional and/or intentional due to neighboring systems, the environment and
malicious nodes. It is the most vulnerable attack [18], as it blocks all communication in
such a way that either the node is permanently set in a sleep mode or runs out of energy
trying to overcome the interference. Thus, the network is denied from its functionality.
The effects of a jamming attack depends on the type, location and noise power of the jam-
mer. 
Apart from jamming, one other physical attack that can be caused to any network is
‘tampering’. Intruders can easily tamper when sensors are deployed in remote or harsh
environments as they are rarely monitored. 
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2.3.1.2  MAC Layer
The MAC layer is the backbone connecting two different nodes to communicate.
Hence, ‘collision’ attack due to a poorly executed data exchange may lead to the acknowl-
edgement (ACK) message becoming a collision attack. Thus, under collision attack the
probability of losing packets is very high affecting the reliability of the application. In
addition, ‘exhaustion’ incinerates the resource availability at the node making it cumber-
some for future communication. The MAC layer is primarily responsible for setting mes-
sage priorities, which if done incorrectly can lead to ‘unfairness’ attack. In this attack,
genuine nodes with the least priority never gets service irrespective of resource availabil-
ity. 
2.3.1.3  Network Layer
Network layer is the foundation of routing protocols for communication between
source and destination. In sensor based networking, minimal routing means minimal delay
which, in turn contributes to ‘data freshness’. But due to the lack of simple security fea-
tures in the routing protocol, ‘misdirection’ can easily occur where the message is re-
directed to any node but the destination. Thus, exploiting the source and participating
(relay) node’s resources. A greedy routing protocol tends to neglect nodes with genuine
traffic in its route due to its greediness and prioritizing its own messages contributing to
‘greed and neglect’ attack. Routing protocol that works based on advertising from neigh-
bors can lead to the ‘black hole’ attack, where both the neighboring and advertised node
exploit resources by actively participating in routing information. 
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2.3.1.4  Transport Layer
The communication between two nodes is managed using transport layer exchanges
maintaining an end-to-end connectivity. The ‘flooding’ attack commonly occurs in this
layer, as multiple requests for resource allocations that end abruptly would lead to exploit-
ing resource of the genuine node. Since nodes require synchronization, a ‘desynchroniza-
tion’ attack by a malicious node can lead to repeated retransmissions of messages leading
to resource exploitation.
2.3.1.5  Other DoS attacks
In a Sybil attack [19 , 20] an illegitimate node presents multiple identity thus deceiving
its neighboring nodes. In a worm-hole attack, the packets are tunneled to another location
and re-sent to bombard the network with communication overhead, thus reducing the
QoS. Sinkhole attack, is one where compromised node attracts traffic from neighboring
nodes. Selective forwarding is another DoS attack, where nodes rather than broadcasting
messages choose to forward messages and only a fraction of message received. 
Since all the above attacks primarily depend on the various layers of the protocol,
incorporating the performance parameters that contribute towards increasing QoS in the
network is used to obtain an optimal and secure route.
2.3.2  Intrusion Detection
Intrusion detection system (IDS) is an important part of securing the network against
abnormal behavior. In some network, IDS is either centered within a cluster or performed
at base station. IDS can be used to detect and predict attacks using predetermined or learn-
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ing strategies. The level of intruder detection and tracking depends primarily on the appli-
cation’s resource availability and time. 
2.3.3  Secure Data Aggregation, Localization, Communication and 
Routing
Other challenges faced by sensor network are data aggregation [21], communication,
routing and node’s localization information. Many applications are deployed in open envi-
ronment where external attacks are very common. Hence, an existence of secure link
enhances authorized nodes and data transmission, but would require aprior knowledge or a
learning algorithm for sensor network management. 
2.3.4  Key Establishment and Privacy
Data security measures in WSN are vital as information used can be very sensitive
depending on the application. Since sensors are so tiny, storing and accessing traditional
key schemes such as Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and other (symmetric and asymmet-
ric key) requires high computational power, memory and energy. Hence, the key establish-
ment strategy helps in achieving data security for nodes, and reduces Sybil attack [22 ,
23]. Data privacy can be maintained in numerous ways, but efficiency and reliability
based on application needs is essential. For example, in an indoor security system, user’s
biometric data is used both for authorization and private key for authentication. Unfortu-
nately when the key is compromised the user identity is jeopardized.
2. 4  Application Security
Security based on the application is primarily responsible for the end user or system
performance. Thus, any protocols, architecture or methods designed based on the applica-
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tion’s constraints, make it unique. The feasibility and adaptability of the proposed
approach should have a certain tolerance level to co-exist with other technology. Many
recently designed application specific methodologies seem to have security features for
each layer, which are inconsiderate in terms of the computation complexity, and resource
exploitation. 
2. 5  Existing Security Solution against Attacks
Many recent research advances in the field of security for sensor networks categorize
based on information (data), service and application. There is no solution against physical
tampering of the nodes i.e., side-channel attack using power analysis can be attempted
easily [24]. Also, when sensor based applications are deployed in remote locations, nodes
are vulnerable to both environmental or attacker induced noisy data. In addition, in certain
applications where node data is available via Internet for remote applications are suscepti-
ble to software attacks prevalent in any wireless applications. The proposed solution given
below can either detect or countermeasure a single attack.
2.5.1  Security Against Information
In data security, existing defensive security measures include schemes such as data
authentication, key establishment, public key cryptography, etc. A pairwise key is man-
aged in Low power Energy Aware Processing (LEAP) [24 , 25] between two nodes, but
neighboring identities need to be established and maintained while all nodes are consid-
ered to be trusted links. In ESLA (Time Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentica-
tion)[26] a key chain distribution with asymmetric key helps reduces the disclosure of
symmetric keys by the sender. The only limitation of this scheme is the sender requires a
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unicast communication to each sensors. A modification to ESLA proposed by Liu and
Ning [27] uses the symmetric key method, where multilevel key chain distribution with
predetermination and broadcasting is used. The protocol allows disclosing keys at a time
interval and the base station also broadcasts disclosed key and initial bootstrapping for
new nodes to conserve energy. The ESLA protocol assures that even if a single node is
compromised, the network is secure. Jolly et al proposed a key management scheme that
relies on probabilistic key sharing with hierarchal links such as gateway. SNEP (Sensor
Network Encryption Protocol) [28] provides security characteristics such as data confi-
dentiality, two-party data authentication, authorization and message freshness using a low
communication overhead of 8 bytes per message. Since the message is encrypted uniquely
each time, it is assumed to prevent eavesdropping. 
In [29] Kong et al proposed a threshold secret updates and certificate security based on
public key infrastructure (PKI). Zhang, Zhou and Yang [30] use node-to-node authentica-
tion that accommodates the pairwise keys with neighboring nodes. Ouyang et al [31] pro-
posed a hashing-based ID randomization (HIR) and Reverse HIR. The HIR is applicable
for sensor anonymity, while RHIR is used when the key is compromised in a network.
Therefore, RHIR requires more storage for the hash data and higher computation. 
Hence, researchers contributed schemes such as TinySec [32], SPINS that claim
resource efficiency and application longevity. Security in TinySec is established using tra-
ditional link layer encryption and authentication such as RC5 or SkipJack ciphers. But,
due to the mathematical crypter operations, network overflow and high packet loss is
encountered. Also, TinySec uses private key cryptography that leads to integration of key
25
distribution, key management and digital signatures techniques. Recently, elliptic curve
cryptography (ECC) is used in TinyOS to distribute keys. 
One other approach to data security is homomorphic schemes that helps in achieving
both data aggregation and confidentiality between one hop nodes, but they are computa-
tionally expensive, time consuming and lack in-network verification for compromised
aggregators. Data integrity is attained by hop by hop key management techniques, where
malicious node is not included in data aggregation. But, there is no such scheme to assure
aggregator node is itself under any threat for unattended sensor network. Some researchers
propose node reputation [33] and data origin authentication methods for data integrity. 
The main drawback of all the above mentioned protocols are computational power,
since sensor nodes are tiny and can store only limited amounts of energy, using assigned
bandwidths and restricting computational cost. Although the protocols promise secure
communications, they fail to accommodate the basic features of sensors. Data security is a
challenging task, although there are many security schemes addressing data integrity,
freshness, confidentiality and authentication. There is on going research in combining all
the features of security in a single security scheme without jeopardizing application’s
resource and availability.
2.5.2  Security Against Sensor Service
Any network requires un-disrupted service irrespective of its deployment, environ-
ment and resources. Sensor nodes in unattended environments can easily be subjected to
attacks by malicious nodes that can disrupt both quality and service. Disrupted service to a
node can be both intentional and unintentional, which can directly affect the network
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capacity and quality of service. DoS attack as discussed previously affects the reliability
of the information, making detection of a DoS threat more crucial than recovering from
the attack. Every layer of the network is vulnerable to attacks such as jamming, collision,
misdirection, flooding, etc., In crucial applications such as disaster relief, health monitor-
ing etc., reduced performance due to DoS will make the network unfit for the application.
Hence, detecting DoS attacks and defending the network by taking the necessary counter-
measures helps in maintaining or improving the performance of the application. 
Interception or compromise of the secure information by an enemy is an act that can-
not be neglected. Hence, appropriate security measures need to be taken at every layer of
the protocol design. Many attacks are caused by intruders who seldom have complete
knowledge of the protocol. There have been several research conducted on the different
kinds of potential DoS attacks on sensor networks. Wood and Stankovic in [34] had sum-
marized different DoS attack and its effect on the sensor network. Though no defense
mechanism was proposed in the survey but different possibilities to reduce the effective-
ness of the attacks were provided. In the physical layer, spread spectrum is often used to
minimize the impact of a jamming attack. I conclude that due to limited resources code
spread, as used in mobile networks cannot be used in WSN.
Channel hopping and physically moving away from a jammer is proposed by Xu et al
in [35]. The approach primarily focussed on determining the occurrence of jamming but
fails to investigate on the amount of overhead in channel hopping and jammer scanning,
which is vital for sensor network. 
In JAM, a mapping protocol for nodes that surround a jammer was proposed. Using
this approach, the protocol creates awareness in the neighboring nodes to detect a jam-
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ming attack using message diffusion. Also, in this paper single-channel wireless commu-
nication was assumed. It was simulated using GloMoSim simulator with different range of
jamming attack and neighboring nodes. The protocol was robust, when a message was re-
routed, only data loss occurred in inactive nodes. The JAM protocol had failure rates of
20-25% of mapping nodes from twelve neighboring nodes within communication range.
DEEJAM [36] a link-layer protocol was proposed to detect stealthy jammers using Zigbee
hardware. The proposed approach required an encoding scheme and suffered packet loss,
due to frame masking, redundant encoding and packet fragmentation. Also, Tay et al in
[37] proposed a link-layer S-MAC protocol to countermeasure jammer attacks using data
blurting and schedule switching. Cagalj et al in [38] proposed worm-hole countermeasure
for jamming attacks, where wired nodes and coordinated frequency hopping (FH) pairs
were used to re-route messages. The shortcoming of the proposed worm-hole method was
the need for deploying wired nodes and the need for synchronization of the FH pairs. 
In [39], a solution for denial of sleep attack using G-MAC protocol was developed.
Nodes will stay awake to receive transmissions if an authenticated request by the GS sta-
tion was sent. Unfortunately, packet loss due to limited wake up time was not considered. 
In [20], a Sybil attack on a network and routing layer of WSN was analyzed. The
authors assumed that a sensor node communicated with its neighbors using half-duplex as
a single RF transmitter with various possible radio channels. The process of identifying
Sybil attacks was based on radio resource testing. Legitimate neighboring nodes are allot-
ted a single channel for identity. This process of identifying a sybil attack cannot function
if the spectrum is jammed. Hence, it would lead to a false identification of a sybil attack.
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In [40] Chaum used anonymous connections to route information against traffic analy-
sis. Wu [41] developed an on-demand position based private (AO2P) routing protocol,
while Wadaa et al’s protocol [42] promises energy-efficiency for coordinate system, clus-
ter and routing structure for maintaining anonymity of network virtual infrastructure. 
In [43], routing security in sensor network was analyzed and a countermeasure was
proposed. Defense mechanisms for different DoS attacks such as spoofing, wormhole,
sybil, selective forwarding etc., was given based on the assumption that using radio fre-
quency alterations can be made to the data. 
In much of the previous research work, DoS attack the transmission was either
assumed secure or intruded but only for injecting wrong data. One of the major catastro-
phes of any network is becoming non functional or unable to communicate. This is the
most adverse attack a sensor network can encounter. This attack can account towards
node’s inability to communicate in spite of sufficient resources. 
2.5.3  Security Against Intrusions
Other than data and service threats sensor nodes are also threatened by insider, out-
sider and other miscellaneous intruder attacks. An intrusion can be caused by a trusted or
malicious node within or outside the network under stealth mode. The primary goal of an
intruder attack is to learn the patterns and simulate a glitch in the application, so that fre-
quent insider attacks can be launched at leisure. There are many intrusion detection system
(IDS) proposed for wireless and ad-hoc networks, but they cannot be applied to sensor
network due to the known resource and time constraints. Security in sensor network is in
its infancy stages where very little research has been initiated in intrusion detection. 
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Zhang et al proposed a intrusion detection scheme in [44] where every node partici-
pates locally and independently in collecting data. The node’s movement and its routing
table updates are traced to build a anomaly detection model. Upon detecting a malicious
node, the local detector broadcasts the message to the network, and every node makes a
final decision based on its neighbors report. But since, the local decision influences the
overall security of the network, computation resources are very high if ‘stealth’ mode
attack is injected by intruders. In [45] a multiple sensor intrusion detection system was
proposed, where a cooperative detection algorithm was applied. A mobile agent with IDS
system and intelligent routing scheme was implemented. This approach requires high
computational and energy resources. 
One other approach to intrusion detection can use game theory. In [46], an intruder
minimizes the ability to get detected while the service provided maximizes the same using
sampling (max-flow problem). Unfortunately, in real life sampling is expensive, and also
the authors have assumed that the intruder has complete knowledge of the network. In
[47], a cooperative packet forwarding framework was proposed. In this approach, static
routes were assumed and behavior of nodes were tracked although a list was not required
to be maintained. Roman, Zhou and Lopez in [48] proposed an IDS framework that can
accommodate local and global agents to act as watchdogs, but unfortunately the nodes
were considered static and there was no implementation of this work nor apparently fur-
ther research to-date.
The above mentioned solutions contribute to security in data, service or intrusion.
Unfortunately, there has been no framework designed that combines all the three phases of
security that also balance resources and application reliability. Since sensor based applica-
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tions require optimal solutions that maximize security, quality of service while minimizing
time and resource availability. An efficient optimization algorithm is best suited to solve
this non-deterministic polynomial-time (NP) problem. 
2. 6  Multi-Objective Problem and Optimization
Sensor based applications involve multitasking, resource balancing while maintaining
the user’s services and security. The basic requirements of security schemes for sensor
network are as follows,
1. Resource constraints
    a. Energy
    b. Bandwidth
    c. Memory
2. Computational complexity
     a. Distributed
     b. Cluster or Mesh
3. Adaptive
    a. Environment aware
    b. Application aware
    c. Resource Aware
4. Detection accuracy 
    a. Reduced false positive claims
    b. Reduced transmission errors
    c. Reliable, Efficient and Optimal Solution
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A multi-objective problem requires solutions that incorporate optimization techniques
where resource constraints are minimized while maximizing performance. Evolutionary
algorithms (EAs) and other techniques such as Ant Colony Optimization (ACO) [49 , 50],
Invasive Weed Optimization Algorithm, Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) [51], are
famous approaches that derive from the genetic and simulated annealing methods. In the
following chapter, we shall analyze the importance of ACO and its role in the proposed
solution, Cognitive Security Framework (CSF). 
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CHAPTER
THREE
Cross-Layered Cognitive Security Protocol
“A route can be long and tiring but definitely can be the safest, thou is Detour”
In the previous chapter, security in sensor network was formulated as a multi-objective
problem. Hence, the need for framework that can balance and optimize resources while
prioritizing security and application performance is essential. The three-tiered Cognitive
Security Framework (CSF) is adaptive to applications depending on resource availability.
The first tier, Cross-Layered Cognitive Security Protocol (C2SP), helps in detecting a
threat and re-routing the message to the sink. In this chapter, a detailed analysis of the
security protocol and its evolution is presented with application. 
There are many algorithms found in literature to attain sub-optimal solution using
meta-heuristic approach such as genetic, simulated annealing applied to travelling sales-
man, asymmetric travelling salesman, job shop scheduling, etc. Each approach possesses
trade-off depending on the application or use. A critical selection criteria for an algorithm
is reduced delay and the probability of obtaining an optimal and reliable solution. Ant Col-
ony Optimization (ACO) algorithm is a learning algorithm with characteristics such as
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robustness and versatility that solves any NP hard problem. In this section, the background
the evolution of ACO and its characteristics are summarized.
3. 1  Cross-Layered Cognitive Intelligence
Cognitive intelligence (CI) is derived from the biological aspect of swarm intelligence
(SI). The learning rate of the proposed algorithm evolves over time. The performance
parameters such as energy, optimal distance, packet delivery rate, packet loss rate and data
traffic are weighed to achieve an energy efficient, secure and goal oriented network. The
process of balancing resource constraint and obtaining a secure optimal route is NP hard
communication problem. SI evolved as the collective behavior from a group of simple
autonomous agents that work in a collaborative manner to achieve a common goal. The
ACO algorithm utilizes the features of the ants (agents) in a real time environment. The
agents (ants) in the system communicate interactively either directly or indirectly in a dis-
tributed problem solving manner. The following subsections gives a brief discussion on
the evolution of the concepts used in cognitive intelligence and its key characteristics.
3.1.1 Evolution of Ant System
The natural adaptability of insects and other creatures to survive and thrive through
cooperative behavior has astounded scientist and researchers enough to analyze the swarm
behavior of ants, bees, and birds and attempt to artificially replicate it. In nature, ants set
out to find food from their home cooperatively. A special group of forage ants are
appointed with this task, who looks for food in a random manner. Stumbling upon an
obstacle, the ants choose alternate routes to reach their destination (food). Over time, the
ants find and share the best routes to destination. If anything changes in the environment
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to affect these routes, the ants simply adapt. The swarm behavior of the ants when imple-
mented in engineering problems are capable of solving many complex, dynamic optimiza-
tion issues. 
3.1.2 Characteristics of C2SP
The three main characteristics of ACO are pheromone deposition, state transition
probability and tabu-list, which are modified to incorporate “cognitive” intuition.
Figure 3.1 shows the agent traversing a maze interactively using low and high phero-
mone deposition. Upon finding an obstacle, the agents deposit low pheromones along the
path warning others of the problem and move forward in their quest to find the destination.
Figure 3.1. Agents traversing a maze [52]
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3.1.2.1  Pheromone deposition
Ants traveling from source to destination interact with other ants using a chemical sub-
stance called ‘pheromones’. Similarly in the artificial ACO algorithm, pheromone deposi-
tion is implemented depending on the visibility of the ant. An agent is an entity capable of
performing tasks autonomously using predefined behaviors or a set of criterion. In imple-
mentation of this approach in an application, agents mimic the swarm behavior of ants or
other creatures. The pheromone deposition along a route increases as more agents traverse
through the route. Also, the attractiveness of a route increases so that the probability that
an agent takes a particular route increases. Agents move toward an optimal solution by
sharing their knowledge with their neighbors. The initial set of agents deployed in the net-
work traverse through all the nodes in a random manner. Each agent leaves trails by
depositing pheromones on the route. 
In C2SP pheromone depositions on the paths serve as a means of communication
between the agents. The agents use the pheromones to help select the best route through
the network. The most secure route is one that has the highest level of pheromone deposi-
tion. The performance metric is applied as the visibility criterion, and incorporated in the
pheromone deposition function by
(EQ 1)
where  is the pheromone deposition; i and j are the source and destination; (t-1) is the
previous pheromone value; t is the visibility of the ant for an entire tour; r is the memory;
and Q is an arbitrary value. 
( ) ( 1)ij ij
t
Qt t    
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The pheromones on all paths are updated at the end of a tour. Thus, the route taken by
the agent is both energy aware and time sensitive. A key feature of the proposed protocol
is that the pheromone deposition (1) can be modified based on the performance require-
ments making it adaptive to any application. 
3.1.3 State Transition Probability
The transition probability of an agent is defined as the probability taken by the agent to
choose a particular node as its next hop towards its destination. Thus, the probability func-
tion (P) includes the performance parameters that impact the network, such as distance
and energy,
(EQ 2)
where  is the link cost function,  and  are the power on the pheromone deposition and
cost function. The link cost function, , is also based on the performance parameters.
Hence, if the distance and energy are of primary concern, then 
ij=cost (D, E) (EQ 3)
This cost function can be modified based on maximization or minimization forming a
multi-objective min-max function. 
3.1.4 Tabu List
A Tabu-list serves as memory tool listing the set of nodes that a single agent has vis-
ited. The agent’s goal is to visit nodes in the network depending on the number of hops.
This list helps agents to avoid looping that can occur during routing. In C2SP, the tabu list
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( ( )) .( ( ))
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eliminates any redundant route traversals thereby conserving node’s energy, and also an
updated estimated energy availability in the nodes for the particular sub-optimal route
with high reachability. Thus, the tabu-list supports energy usage prediction and decisions
concerning situation assessment. The use of the tabu-list information for pattern analysis
and will be discussed in the next chapter.
The pheromone deposition, tabu-list, and energy monitoring help this novel ACO
algorithm to obtain an optimal solution and adapt during node degradation. These three
modified characteristics can be tailored to any specific application making C2SP robust
and versatile. 
Success of an algorithm is defined as attaining the optimal solution. The computation
time is defined as the amount of time the algorithm takes to obtain an optimal solution. In
some cases, a combination of artificial intelligence such as a Bayesian network [53], and
any of the EAs can achieve better results. A trade-off between factors affecting the overall
performance of a system is primarily application dependent. The advantage of using EA is
primarily because the population is searched in a parallel manner and not in a one-to-one
basis. EAs do not require any derivative information or any auxiliary knowledge. EAs
require only the objective function and the fitness level for performing a directive search.
It uses only probabilistic transition rules rather than deterministic ones. Therefore, EAs
are generally more straightforward to apply. EAs can provide a number of potential solu-
tions to a given problem if all solutions produce identical performance. There exist possi-
bility that EAs could lead to a pre-mature solution, but it’s upon the user to define the
fitness function in a way to obtain global optima rather than a local optima. In the follow-
ing section the cognitive protocol adaptive to the security features is explained in detail.
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3. 2  Cross-Layered Cognitive Security Protocol
There are tremendous advantages in deploying a sensor-based protocol, which will
include self-adaptive and self-organizing behavior. The robustness and de-centralized fea-
tures of the C2SP attains a feasible solution even during node degradation due to resource
or attack. The C2SP’s adaptiveness is based on the flexible cost function that can be mod-
ified to suite any application thereby making it a generic solution. A secure protocol can
be designed only with in-depth knowledge of the application. Sensors are faced with many
constraints namely wireless channel, quality of service, and energy efficiency issues. 
3.2.1 Wireless Channel Constraint
The sensor communication through a wireless medium affects the quality of data
transmission. The quality of information is affected in a sensor network application based
on the following: 
1. The nodes are half-duplex, thus cannot receive packets if node is in transmit mode lead-
ing to traffic congestion.
2. Wireless channel has noise, fading and shadowing that could deteriorate transmission.
3. Interference from neighboring nodes, can lead to packet drop. 
4. Limited bandwidth restrict transmitting heavy data i.e., biometric
5. Propagation delay 
6. Error in clock synchronization affects location information. 
7. Error control strategies lead to heavy computation. 
The protocol design should consider these constraints to improve the quality and quan-
tity of information. 
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3.2.2 Quality of Service Constraint
Quality of service is an important factor in any wireless application as it directly
affects the performance of the network. Traditional wired networks provide high reliable
information without user convenience. Hence in wireless networks a trade-off between
different parameters has to be attained in providing good QoS and reliable service. Also,
the QoS varies dynamically based on the user’s request. Hence, a weighing scheme tai-
lored to each individual request would increase the QoS. The common parameters that are
used in QoS are distance, energy, and packet delivery. In sensor based application, QoS
cannot be judged based on packet drop, as nodes relay prioritized messages. Whereas, the
frequency of packet drop by a node also relates to its reputation. Hence, careful consider-
ation of the metrics that affect performance and reliability is needed.
3.2.3 Energy Efficiency
Energy efficiency impacts the lifetime of the sensors, which directly reflects the net-
work lifetime. The energy level at each node needs to be tracked, and should be set with
different threshold levels to avoid simultaneous node failures. Also, the sensors can com-
municate using different power control schemes, which allow them to use high energy
level to transmit during priority events signal and switch to lower energy level for normal
traffic. The use of thresholds at the node also helps in identifying the node’s lifetime and
its coverage ability. 
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3.2.4 Cross-Layer Approach
Every layer of a sensor network reflects the performance of the application. Hence a
cross-layer approach that can work collectively to improve the QoS is preferred. There are
also some potential risks in cross-layer design as discussed in [54] that leads to a ‘spa-
ghetti effect’. Thus an intelligent approach that has the learning ability to improve the reli-
ability of network using cross-layer approach is designed and presented here using
cognitive intelligence. 
3.2.4.1  Salient Features
C2SP overcomes the constraints of sensor nodes by extending the ACO algorithm
using partially ordered sets (POSets). POSets is a weighing scheme that helps in attaining
multiple objective solutions using reinforcement. 
There are different types of reinforcement namely positive, negative, penalizing and
extinction. The positive and negative reinforcement helps to increase the strength of
response, whereas the penalizing and extinction characterizes a weaker behavior. A rein-
forcement parameter is incorporated in C2SP to achieve global solution. In applications
like Smart Grid, Health Monitoring, it is best to improve the learning behavior of the
agents rather than penalizing or extinguishing the solution.
The performance of a system is affected due to improper and inflexible design struc-
ture. The salient features of the C2SP helps in achieving the following
1. Adaptive Modulation Scheme
2. Adaptive Error Correction Scheme
3. Adaptive Power Control Scheme
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4. Adaptive Traffic
5. Adaptive QoS
6. Message Prioritization
The performance parameters such as energy, distance, successful packet delivery,
packet loss rate and data traffic are weighed to achieve an energy efficient, secure and
mission oriented network. The meta-heuristic cross layer protocol combines the factors
that affect the performance in physical, MAC and routing layer to achieve maximized per-
formance for using minimal resource thus achieving a multi-objective solution. C2SP is a
hybrid algorithm that self-adapts, self-organizes and evolves to the network’s needs. The
salient features of the agents are combined with POSets which helps in attaining an appli-
cation driven performance. 
3.2.4.2  POSets
One of the major challenges in sensor management is providing a mathematical frame-
work that can consistently represent the complex multidimensional optimization problem.
POSets has been used in queuing theory, networking, and lately sensor management [55,
56]. POSets provides a graphical mathematical framework for representing relationships
between a finite numbers of elements [57].
POSets formulates weights at each graphical level to flow down the importance of the
performance parameter measuring the expected system goal. In sensor based applications,
the performance is broken down to speed of alert, and downtime. Downtime is the per-
centage of time the system is not functional because a sensor node is depleted of energy.
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The speed of alert is the response of the system based on the hops, distance and BER in
receiving the message. 
In Figure 3.2, the four levels to the mission POSet are illustrated. The performance
parameters are weighed based on its importance. The initial weights are assigned by the
user, and can also be automated based on previous analogies from agent’s information.
The flow down of weights i.e., the lower case variables on the arrows should sum to one
from their source. The entire POSet begins with a value of 1 at the top. Then the arrows
exiting that node should sum to 1 or 
Figure 3.2. Illustration to support POSets computation.
The values of the next row of nodes is computed by multiplying the arrow’s value by
the preceding node or
2
1
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k
x

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(EQ 4)
The computation of the remaining POSet structure can precede in the same manner.
The POSet provides a weighting scheme to guide the creation of a single global perfor-
mance parameter so that sensor parameter decisions can be made by the sensor agents. For
example, distance and the number of hops need to be emphasized if the sensor network
needs to quickly send messages during priority queries or when distress events are sensed.
Saving energy to prolong the life of the sensors is less important at that particular point in
the system’s lifetime. The weights are then computed from 
(EQ 5)
The total performance is computed in for N parameters (N=4 here)
(EQ 6)
where  is the global network performance parameter, and Wi is the weighting from the
POSets structure in (5). The operator may make new decisions at this point as to the
weighting applied in the POSet. These weights are then applied to the modified ACO
algorithm to obtain the desired performance on the next system update.
3. 3  Sensor based Applications
Sensor based networks have developed in the recent years, and as discussed in Chapter
1 is found in our day-to-day life. Recently, the demand of pervasive sensor networks is
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extended to many real world applications such as health monitoring, habitat monitoring,
emergency evacuations, etc. This process of wireless distribution of data helps timely
updates and eminent measures under emergency situations. Unfortunately, there are also
some challenges involved in providing cost and energy efficient application. The two
main application addressed here is Health-care monitoring and Emergency Responder
Network. Both these applications are heterogenous in nature, where devices vary in mis-
sion and requires coordination between sensors with limitations. 
3.3.1 Health-care Monitoring
In the wake of ubiquitous technology, medical applications have taken a new road,
where cure and treatment is found by mining information and providing global assistance.
The main challenge of sharing sensitive data is patient’s privacy, as there are policies
ensuring data confidentiality but little can be done if a sensor is been tampered physically.
Health-care applications process time sensitive data, hence transmitting the information
45
using distributed, reliable and robust routing protocol becomes a vital role in any real-time
application.
Figure 3.3.  Sensor based Health-care Network 
Figure 3.3 illustrates a health monitoring framework [58], where the nodes are spread
in three forms, wired, wireless and mobile forming a heterogeneous network. A wireless
node can be embedded on a patient in a non-intrusive manner to monitor his/her vital
signs. While, mobile nodes can be placed on ambulances, where the emergency vehicles
can either receive or send data to the nearest hospital or patient. The received data can be
shared with individuals globally via web service to patient’s caregivers, doctors, EMS,
and nurses. The wired and wireless nodes are placed in the hospital where continued mon-
itoring of outgoing and incoming patients with added functionality such as securing access
inside building is also maintained. The data captured and transmitted are location, vital
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signs (temperature, heart rate etc) and biometric information. In this application, the data
is collected continuously and by priority requests. Also, unlike fire monitoring applica-
tions where sensors data can be aggregated, in health-care every patient’s data is unique
and require varied care and hence, relevant 
The assumptions made in this application are as follows,
• Some sensors are equipped with localization information and act as beacon for the add-
on nodes
• Energy source on the beacon nodes are never drained. 
•  Nodes have the ability to authenticate and authorize appropriate information to satisfy 
1996 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).
• The nodes serve multicast communication for enabling data availability to multiple 
receivers
• Multiple routes are a necessity due to the mobility of both sender and receiver.
• Half-duplex communication is assumed between nodes
• Not all nodes in the network are compromised (i.e., k nodes out of N sensors)
• The source and sink node are unaffected by any DoS attack (i.e., relay nodes act as 
malicious nodes)
• Data transmission is strictly based on priority 
• Every received message has a ‘t’ delay, but less than a threshold to satisfy ‘data fresh-
ness’.
3.3.1.1  Experimental Network 
A network of 25 sensor nodes, the agents are spread at random across the network to
speed up the search process. Monte Carlo simulations were performed for sensor node
scattered across a 2D space with Euclidean distances between 2 nodes of
(EQ 7)
2 2
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The energy and threshold at each sensor node is varied, thus increasing the network’s
lifetime. The sensor’s lifetime can be calculated using the modified definition of [59]
(EQ 8)
where 0 is the non-rechargeable initial energy, E(Ew), expected wasted energy, Pc, the
constant power consumption, , the number of received messages, E(Er), the expected
reporting energy, the sensing rate, and E(Es), the expected sensing energy. 
The agents are energy aware and know the energy status of each sensor node. As the
agent moves from node to node, energy is lost through communication. The agents do not
traverse nodes with depleted energy. New paths are set up that avoid such nodes so that
communication remains functional without the degraded sensor. The agents do not require
initial solutions in the system during initial setup. This allows the system to be more flexi-
ble, robust, decentralized and intelligent. These agents ensure the optimal route to the des-
tination using limited resources and also learn the network environment. Initial
computational cost and time is high but this drops drastically once the agents adapt to the
network and environment. 
The concept of sensor based health-care application is that nodes participate in routing
if their energy is above a certain threshold. The sensor’s whose energy fall below a set
threshold is considered down or depleted. Thus, these nodes are neglected and an alternate
route is taken. This keeps the network functional even during individual node failure.
Only for a priority message, sensors with low energy levels participate in routing.
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The agents accumulate pheromones as they traverse from source i to sink j. Hence dis-
tance travelled, energy, BER and hops are the critical parameters that need to be consid-
ered while depositing the trails. Hence (1) is modified for this cognitive protocol as
(EQ 9)
where Dt, Ht, Et and BERt are the total distance, hop, energy and bit error rate perfor-
mance, respectively, of the current agent in a tour. The link cost function is modified based
on the QoS parameters as 
(EQ 10)
In (9) ‘a’ is the actual and ‘r’ is the required value for data transmitting. The minimiza-
tion cost function for the normalized value of performance parameters is applied. Thus
increasing the QoS and also incorporating the cross-layered meta-heuristic approach. 
The transition probability for normal traffic determines the routes chosen by the ants
and is calculated as in (2) using values from both (9) and (10). Whereas for handling prior-
ity events and random queries (distress signals), the priority of the message needs to be
incorporated into the transition probability as
(EQ 11)
where is the message priority, and  is the global performance from the swarm agents
As previously discussed, the tabu-list is a main feature of the ACO algorithm, which
keeps track of the nodes visited by the agents. In our C2SP algorithm, since we modified
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the pheromone and transition probability, the routes reflect energy efficiency and resource
optimized solutions. The meta-heuristic algorithm ensures the optimal route to the destina-
tion using limited resources and also learning the network environment. 
3.3.1.2  Simulated Attack Scenario
Interception of the secure information by enemy is an act that cannot be neglected.
Hence, apt security measures need to be taken at every layer of a protocol design. The
DoS attack is caused by the malicious node or a friendly node under adversary attack. 
The main DoS attack imposed on the health-care is Wormhole, as they are simple pas-
sive attacks, i.e., attack is launched only if the malicious node receives a message. In a
wormhole attack the ‘malicious’ node receives message from one end of the network and
tunnel on the other using wired or wireless links. A act of tunneling the packets with low
latency can gain neighbors trust as “shortest” route to destination. And also refrain the
destination node from knowing multiple routes.  
Figure 3.4.  Wormhole attack on Sensor based Network
A
D
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Figure 3.4 illustrates a wormhole attack, where nodes B and C are the malicious nodes
with wired and wireless links directly to node D, and thus are closer to the sink (destina-
tion). Therefore, other routes R1, R2 and R3 is not discovered by the sink, and even if it
was they get neglected considering the high latency. Many protocols such as Distance
Source Routing (DSR) get trapped in such situations or application scenarios.
In C2SP, DoS attack is detected based on the updated tabu-list available to all agents.
Since, the list maintains the distance, energy, number of hops, packet delivery and bit
error rate of every optimal route taken, a random validation between the current route and
listed path is matched for any distance or energy variation from the threshold. If the error
falls within a expected threshold, the nodes along the route is assumed to be legitimate
otherwise the entire route is penalized for a time instant t seconds. Since the tabu-list con-
sist of back-up routes the neighboring node takes the next best optimal route from the list
as an act of countermeasure. In health-care the nodes that join the network usually sends
out a request for authentication, which can be used to our benefit as “probe” signal to
check for wormhole nodes. Also, by knowing the wormhole locations, during emergency
situations these wormhole nodes can be used as relay nodes. As the main objective is to
diffuse data to the destination to save lives, while trading security.
3.3.1.3  Simulated Results
The simulation is performed on an Indoor and Outdoor health-care monitoring system
under wormhole attack using Matlab. The message is communicated using Binary Phased
Shift Keying (BPSK) modulation schemes, therefore the BER, energy consumption and
packet delivery rate (PDR) in each of these cases are compared to verify, which attack
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worsens the performance of the application. The dependency of successful packet deliv-
ery, packet lost at the source, energy consumption, distance taken in reaching the destina-
tion and the number of hops is based on the weights assigned by human or artificial
intelligence.
In Table 3.1 the wormhole attack on an Indoor and outdoor application using C2SP is
shown, where 2, 4, 8, 10 and 15 nodes are compromised. The robustness and resource effi-
ciency of the application is maintained by C2SP with an average PDR of 87% and 81% for
Indoor and outdoor scenario. The main objective of detecting the DoS attack is to increase
the lifetime and reliability of the application, hence the average energy consumed and
PDR is compared for an indoor and outdoor application. The threshold settings for both
the indoor and outdoor were the same, which can be varied considering the influences of
environmental conditions. 
The key reason for choosing PDR and energy consumption is to balance the metrics
optimally where maximization of PDR and minimization of energy is required. But under
adverse conditions i.e., where a life of an individual is given higher prioritization, weight
using POSETs is given to the PDR higher than the energy consumed. 
Table 3.1. Performance of Indoor & Outdoor Health-care Monitoring Against Wormhole 
attack Using C2SP
Node
PDR: 
Indoor
PDR: 
Outdoor
Avg. EC: 
Indoor.
Avg. EC: 
Outdoor.
2 0.9941 0.9953 18.3326 6.1957
4 0.9905 0.9641 15.0853 21.0754
8 0.8952 0.8326 32.7419 28.5675
10 0.7952 0.7167 76.0974 63.8761
15 0.682 0.6011 53.08 76.0887
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3.3.2 Emergency Responder Network
In Figure 3.5 an emergency responder application [59] is illustrated where the rescue
mission is carried out by installing an ad-hoc sensor network on the fly in real-time. QoS
and response time to transmit information to the sink is critical. The sensors are placed by
responders as they enter the building, and serve as bread crumbs from the source to sink.
The sensors can be placed on the ground or mounted on the wall depending on the cover-
age needs. The data communications between responders and the command center can
contain critical information. Hence, multi-user interference (MUI) needs to be reduced for
the critical communications. 
Figure 3.5. Sensor based Emergency Response Network
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The data routed from each responder to the sink (or command center) utilizes the sen-
sors to relay messages in an optimal fashion. Several issues need to be addressed while
designing a protocol for it. First, the data transmission such as voice, vital statistics of
responders and victims from bio-sensors, and location of people and resources requires a
protocol that can adapt to the needs of the emergency. Second, the distress signal by any
responder should be given highest priority during routing. Third, the location measure-
ments require time synchronization between sensors to minimize error and timely transfer
to the command center. Apart from data transmission, the protocol should be robust and
adaptive to incorporate sensor failures or additions. 
In this application the primary target is to acquire location information of responder
accurately, hence modulation scheme that aids in reduced error is best suited. There are
many modulation schemes available for signal design. Instead of using carrier frequen-
cies, ultra-wideband (UWB) systems transmit information using trains of short time dura-
tion pulses that spread the energy from the near direct current to a few gigahertz. UWB
technology performs efficiently for two extremes in wireless communication systems:
short range, high data-rate personal area network (PAN) applications such as the IEEE
802.15.3a at 3.1 - 10.6GHz and 802.15.4a longer range, low data rate personal area net-
works (PAN) applications below 960 MHz. A blueprint of the indoor building system is
available at the command center, yet due to fire access changes constantly. 
3.3.2.1  Experimental Network
In this application, we have designed two UWB pulses that can be considered orthog-
onal due to their frequency separation. The low data rate signal can be used for dual pur-
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pose, such as supporting data transmission for vital statistics and location estimates if time
synchronization is carefully maintained. As one of the IEEE 802.15.4a physical layer
technique candidates, Impulse-based UWB (I-UWB) is particularly attractive for sensor
networks due to its resilience to multipath interference, simple transceiver circuitry, accu-
rate ranging ability, inherent security, and low transmission power. 
Figure 3.6. Power Spectral Density (PSD) of pulse combined by 7th, 10th and 15th 
Gaussian derivatives based on FCC Indoor UWB emission mask
The bi-pulse modulation in UWB is a special case of PAM modulation. We use one
pulse with two polarizations. The peak of the pulse facing up stands for bit “1”, while fac-
ing down stands for “0”. The bi-pulse UWB can provide high data rates to neighboring
sensor nodes when the network’s throughput is the critical function as well as a lower
bandwidth pulse for low data rate messages [60]. When only sensing is needed, then UWB
can support longer range measurements with slightly longer pulse lengths using the low
bandwidth UWB pulse better suited for accurate time measurements. In order to transmit
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UWB with other types of signals without interfering, without exceeding the power is a key
design issue
One approach to resolve the key design issue is to combine different orders of Gauss-
ian derivative pulses, the current most popular family of UWB pulses. An interesting fea-
ture of the Gaussian derivative pulse is that it naturally increases its “center” in frequency
as the order of derivative increases. We take advantage of this and combine pulses as
shown in Figure 3.6, the PSD of the pulses show that the designed pulse [63] not only con-
forms to the FCC indoor mask, but also effectively exploits the available power spectrum. 
3.3.2.2  Simulated Attack Scenario
Due to the severity of location information in emergency responder application, the
effect of Sybil attack is analyzed. In Sybil attack, the “malicious” node impersonates and
becomes a part of multiple routes by denying genuine relay nodes from participating in
routing. In addition, a Sybil node tends to relay messages initially and later drops the
packets thus degrading overall application performance.
Figure 3.7 illustrates an example of Sybil impersonator [61] as node ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’.
There are many approaches as discussed in Chapter 1 to reduce Sybil attack such as
authenticating techniques. Since emergency responder uses nodes to identify their location
on the fly, the first node placed acts as a beacon. The assumptions made on the simulated
scenario is as follows,
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Figure 3.7. Sybil attack in Sensor Network
• Only attacker has multiple identities, i.e., genuine node is always unique.
• Reputation/Voting of node is earned through ‘genuine’ neighbor trust.
• No two Sybil nodes are neighbors i.e., direct communication between ‘genuine’ and 
‘fake’ nodes.
• Sybil nodes resource computation is inconsistent i.e., inefficient resource usage.
• Sybil node may drop or corrupt a message with ‘t+1’ delay.
In emergency responder application, there are multiple sensors that provide location
information i.e., responder’s vital signal and radio. Thus, fusing different values can locate
the impersonator accurately under severe conditions. During normal activity, only limited
information is available and such impersonation leads to failure of packets being delivered
to the destination and unnecessary exhaustion of resources by other nodes. Hence, predict-
ing such an attack is crucial to the performance of the network.
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3.3.2.3  Simulated Results 
A sensor network with 25 nodes is simulated using Matlab, and equal number of
agents randomly placed on the nodes. After converging, the agents adapt to the network
using the knowledge acquired from their neighbors. The parameters settings of C2SP is
from [62], and is assumed to be  Q =The initial pheromone value
as 10. The stability of the algorithm is analyzed by iterating all scenarios for 100 runs.
The robustness of the algorithm is analyzed in a noisy and fading channel using UWB
Scholtz model [63] for pulse amplitude modulation (PAM) and pulse position modulation
(PPM). The number of multiuser is assumed to be 6 for a resolvable communication path
of L=2 and 4. The network’s average BER, lifetime (energy) and PDR for low, medium
(med) and high priority messages using UWB-PAM gives more data capacity in compari-
son to UWB-PPM when L=4. The message with higher priority is transmitted with more
energy using power control schemes, whereas medium and low priority messages are
based on normal traffic and thus give a prolonged network lifetime. 
Table 3.2 shows Sybil attack on an indoor emergency responder system, and as dis-
cussed earlier, the malicious node corrupts or drops messages. Therefore PDR, BER and
energy are given higher weights to identify the attack. 
Table 3.2. Performance of Indoor Emergency Responder Against Sybil attack Using 
C2SP
No. of 
Sybil 
Nodes PDR
BER
(bit/s)
E
(mJ)
Latency 
(sec)
2 0.96 0.0125 13.65 2
4 0.921 0.031 22.733 4
8 0.842 0.0424 21.229 12
12 0.75 0.066 32.345 13
15 0.6213 0.0829 41.507 19
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3. 4  Research Conclusion
In this chapter the versatility and robustness of C2SP was analyzed using health-care
and emergency responder application. C2SP performed reliably with efficient transmis-
sion during both Sybil and Wormhole attacks where half the network was under attack.
In the health-care application, C2SP’s random validation ensures longevity of routes
and resources. If more than half nodes are compromised then this validation method may
lead to penalizing routes with genuine nodes. Hence, there are limitations in using the
threshold based approach, where only k nodes out of n nodes can be compromised. Unfor-
tunately, when the source or the destination itself is under attack then the message is either
stored at the neighboring node for a random time slot. 
The PDR of wormhole attack on a Outdoor network was worse when compared with
an Indoor scenario. This is attributed to the fact that outdoor environmental conditions
such as fading, shadowing influence the performance of the sensors and the routing algo-
rithm. The cognitive algorithm should consider these external conditions and therefore,
should eliminate the presence of any intruder node. Simulation shows that wireless appli-
cation is efficient in energy consumption while maintaining transmission accuracy. This
also shows that the wireless health monitoring application is competitive to the traditional
system in accuracy but not in terms of security. When wireless applications are considered
security of application needs to be traded-off to a limited extent.
In emergency responder application, performance metrics such as PDR, distance,
energy usage, and response time is weighted more than sensor’s lifetime. This is due to the
assumption that lives are at risk at every time interval so the responders must be protected
before the sensors. The parameters selection criteria is primarily dependent on the applica-
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tion, which can be modified as needed. UWB can inherently support multiple capacities
while being naturally orthogonal. This characteristic with the C2SP controlling the com-
munication layers can improve resource efficiency, adds robustness, operates in a de-cen-
tralized manner and adds flexibility to the message content and speed. 
C2SP aids in routing messages through genuine nodes as a countermeasure whereas
identifying and locating an attacker is performed more accurately using mining techniques
that are discussed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER
FOUR
Bayesian based C2SP Approach
“First act of security is to defend and then confront based on your resource availability” 
In the previous chapter, a countermeasure was proposed upon detecting a security
threat. As sensor nodes are prone to DoS attacks and detecting the threats is crucial in any
application. This chapter is dedicated to accurately locating the malicious node when a
threat is detected using characteristics learned about the application and environment. The
C2SP approach uses POSets to weigh on performance metrics. This approach can be fur-
ther improved using Bayesian intelligence in locating malicious nodes. In addition, an
abnormal behavior of a node can also be predicted well in advance based on the availabil-
ity of resource and training data. 
Bayesian Networks (BN) is used in representing and reasoning problems by modeling
the elements of uncertainty. The decision from the BN is applied to C2SP forming an
hybrid intelligence approach to re-route the information and disconnecting the malicious
nodes in future routes is discussed below.
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4. 1  Bayesian Network
Bayesian Networks are used in representing reasoning problems by modeling the ele-
ments of uncertainty. BN algorithms can be used as a scalable approach to operational
decisions such as prediction and detection concerning the sensor network. The algorithm
of BN is applied to make decisions in the real world environment. BNs are constructed to
represent the uncertainties that are interpreted by conditional probabilities during the pro-
cess of situation assessment. 
BN is a graphical model that represents probabilistically relationships among variables
of interest. Let X={X1, X2,..., Xn} denote a set of random variables related probabilisti-
cally through P(X1, X2,..., Xn), and x1, x2,... xn be the possible values taken by these vari-
ables respectively. BN consists of a directed acyclic graph (DAG) that corresponds to the
conditional independence for X and the local aprior probability distributions associated
with each variable. This structure gives the joint probability distribution for X. The pro-
cess for obtaining DAG can be implemented step by step. It starts by designating X1,
which means it is not influenced by any other variables, and assign it the aprior probability
P(X1). Next if X1 is a cause for X2, then establish a directed edge from X1 to X2 and quan-
tify this link with the conditional probability P(X2|X1). X1 is a parent node of X2. If X1 has
no influence on X2, they are conditionally independent and P(X2|X1)=0. At the ith stage,
the node Xi has potential parents represented by drawing the appro-
priate parent to child link with corresponding conditional probability . This hierar-
chical process continues until all variables have a place in the DAG and all causal
i X1 X2 Xi 1–  
P Xi i  
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relationships between parents and children are shown by direct links in the graph. The net-
work formalism then provides the joint probability distribution for X given by 
. (EQ 1)
These joint probabilities then provide quantitative assessments of the problem domain
that has been modelled. BN is used to maintain the relationships between desired perfor-
mance values and parameter requirements for the system. Any scheme best works only if
the application and its requirements are known. In this chapter, the jamming attack is ana-
lyzed to determine the location of the intruder. The characteristics of different types of
jammer has varied effects on the network performance, which is discussed in the follow-
ing section.
4. 2  Jammer Attack or Radio Interference
A radio interference is caused by using a jammer, which is a device that can partially
or entirely disrupt a node’s signal, by increasing its PSD. Jammer can never re-produce a
signal nor can it pretend like a receiver node. A jammer intentionally reduces the QoS and
increases transmission delay of the application. The application of spread spectrum (SS)
techniques developed by the end of World War II. Using SS technique the data is spread
across the frequency spectrum making the signal resilient to jamming, noise and eaves-
dropping. Depending on the modulation scheme opted for the physical layer, jamming the
node from its peers varies.
P X1 X2 Xi 1–   P Xi i  
i 1=
n
=
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4.2.1 Jammer’s Characteristics
A jammer’s sole purpose is to disrupt node’s service but also to be coy of its existence.
The parameters such as signal strength of a jammer, the location and the type influences
the performance of the network and each jammer has different effect on the node. 
 There are different types of SS such as Direct Sequence (DS), Frequency hopping
(FH), Time hopping (TH) and hybrid. There are advantages as well as disadvantages asso-
ciated with using SS in sensor networks. 
The advantages are as follows:
1. Ability to alleviate multi-path interference, 
2. Jamming attacks reduced, and 
3. Less power spectral density. 
The disadvantages are as follows:
1. Bandwidth inefficiency, 
2.  Complex implementation, and 
3. Computational cost.
Bluetooth [64]uses FHSS, which consumes more power as frequency hops needs to be
synchronized. Whereas, Zigbee [65] uses IEEE802.15.4 standard where DSSS with
CSMA-CA is used. Of late, Zigbee is being considered as the prevalent wireless technol-
ogy for wireless sensor networks as it consumes less power. The modulation scheme for
sensor network uses adaptive modulation technique in a Rayleigh fading channel. Thus,
jamming this network that uses DS/FH spread spectrum is not trivial.
Figure 4.1 pictorially describes the jammer attack on a sensor network. The network is
not only disrupted by adversary attacks but also by the environment. Differentiating the
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attack from natural environmental conditions requires knowledge of the various kinds of
attacks that can be caused by an illegitimate user or intruder. Since an attack can com-
pletely eliminate a coverage area and in certain applications where network cannot be
immediately updated, the network performance will be poor. Hence, study of different
characteristics of an attack keeps the attack attempts at minimal as the knowledge of the
types of jammers help in taking the appropriate countermeasure.   
Figure 4.1.  Jammer Attack on Sensor Network
 In this chapter, it is assumed that there are four different types of jammers [66, 67, 68]
namely: 
1. Single-tone Jammer, 
2. Multiple tone Jammer,
3. Pulsed-noise Jammer and 
4. Reactive Jammer. 
Jammer
Lost coverage 
area
Active node
Rail Roads
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4.2.2 Single-Tone Jammer
A single-tone jammer (STJ) interrupts signal’s whose frequency lies within the speci-
fied bandwidth of the signal and can be easily designed using an oscillator. A STJ targets
any narrow band communication. Since traditional wireless sensor network use narrow
band technology. This kind of jammer tries to continuously jam the node within specified
bandwidth, which results in a dead link and diminishes the node’s coverage. Recent sensor
based applications consist of both existing modulation and wideband technology, jammers
of all kinds should be considered while modelling a security scheme.
4.2.3 Multiple-Tone Jammer
A jammer that can disrupt the signal of some or entire channel (sub-carrier) of a multi-
ple channel receiver. In this case, the attacker is assumed to have knowledge of the ‘sub-
carrier’ of the node’s spectrum. This type of jamming leads to a complete node failure
when the entire channel is compromised. The only time the node can recover is when the
jammer is turned off. Typically, an intruder plays it safe while jamming a node by occa-
sionally turning off its radio. Thus, make the neighboring node assume the node is not
under attack but rather lost its energy and needs recuperation. Hence, detecting a jammed
node is very critical. 
4.2.4 Pulsed-Noise Jammer 
A pulsed-noise jammer (PNJ) is a wideband jamming, which behaves like a pulsed
signal by turning on and off periodically. The primary goal of this jammer, is to disrupt the
spread spectrum communication by spreading the peak jamming power during the “on”
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time. Two types of pulsed-noise jammers are considered, namely, slowly switching and
fast switching jammers.
In slow switching jammer, the frequency of the jamming signal switching from “on”
to “off” pulse is less than bit frequency of the genuine signal. Therefore, leading to jam-
ming a signal for a whole symbol duration Ts. Therefore, a genuine transmission signal
loss is encountered, yet the BER or the number of corrupted messages are less. 
Whereas in a fast switching jammer, the frequency of the jamming signal switches
from “on” pulse for a fraction of symbol duration Ts, and remain “off” for the rest of the
signal. Thus affecting the ‘genuine’ signal and corrupting message transmission. 
4.2.5 Reactive Jammer
Reactive jammer is one of the worst jammer attack, as it would cripple the node of its
service by being active anytime it senses the node’s availability. Although this strategy of
constantly jamming the node’s service leads to easily identifying the existence and loca-
tion of jammer, yet it achieves its purpose of degrading the application’s performance. An
intelligent jammer attacks nodes such that both neighboring nodes and the victim believes
there are no relay nodes forcing them to go to idle to sleep mode.
In the following section, mathematical formulation based on the different types of
jamming is described with simulations. 
4. 3  Bayesian based C2SP
Bayesian based information depends entirely on the node’s attributes by monitoring a
group behavior over a period of time. Detection of any attack is important while trying to
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secure the link from intruders. Hence a hypothesis is formulated that helps in detecting
whether the DoS claim is authentic. 
The jamming attack can be classified into four possible decisions namely, 
1. Sensor out of resources - is accepted, 
2. Sensor encounters a resource outage but falsely calls it a Jammer attack, 
3. DoS-Jammer attack is accepted. and 
4. DoS-Jammer attack is rejected and claimed as resource outage.
 The accuracy of the decision is specified in terms of the rate with which the system
makes decision 2 and 3, which are erroneous. The error described in 2 is referred to as
False Rejection Rate (FRR). The error in 3 is the False Acceptance Rate (FAR). Genuine
acceptance rate (GAR) is one other performance measure, where GAR = 1-FAR. These
quantities are specified in terms of conditional probabilities. In detection theory [ref-69
final], FAR, FRR and GAR are commonly known as the false alarm rate, miss rate and
detection rate.
The problem of DoS using jamming attack in the physical layer of a sensor network
can be formulated as a hypothesis testing problem where the two hypotheses are 
H0: The DoS claim is false and 
H1: The DoS claim is genuine. 
The claims made by the BN directly reflects as weights on the route by penalizing
nodes. This can be revisited upon verification of false claims. There is always a possibility
of false positives and false negatives based on the severity of the environment and attack
model. 
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The receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve serves as a tool for analysis the
false positive rate with the sensitivity of the application. Using the generic ROC curve as
shown in Figure 4.2, the suboptimal solutions are discarded. As for our bayesian based
C2SP approach, the detection rate of jammer attack and the false positive is considered a
valuable resource in eliminating unwanted solutions and also in detecting the jammer’s
location. The location of the jammer is achieved by taking a centroid of all the DoS claims
from the ‘genuine’ nodes. Although, the jammer location is obtained only after a few iter-
ations or the purpose of eliminating it from future communication is more critical. 
Figure 4.2. Denial of Service Detection 
The BN resides at the ‘super’ node, which has infinite power and bandwidth thus
enabling it to act as a watchdog and mine information received from multiple nodes. A
jammer usually sends out a noise signal and hence a measurement of signal-to-interfer-
ence -plus-noise ratio (SINR) is essential.
The performance of bayesian based C2SP approach against jammer attacks is tested
on vehicular ad-hoc network scenario. In VANET application both narrowband and wide-
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band technologies are used and the nodes adaptively communicate with neighbors and
base station based on its functionality and availability. In the Biometric application only
narrowband technology is used, where each node has prior knowledge of its location.
Hence, varied types of jammer affects can be studied using simulated VANET and Bio-
metric application. 
4. 4  Vehicular Ad-hoc Network
A growing need for automated and intelligent transportation [52] support is required to
facilitate dynamic on-road assistance, emergency evacuations, etc over a vast geographic
area. Current transportation support system has many shortcomings such as mobility, scal-
ability, adaptability and cost. Devices and applications based on wireless technology
70
promises cheap and tiny sensors that can sense information within its coverage area and
relay information using multi-hops. 
Figure 4.3. Vehicular Ad-hoc NETwork (VANET)
Vehicular Ad-hoc network (VANET) is an emerging technology where vehicle-to-
vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communicate in a wireless manner
using dedicated short-range communication band. Figure 4.3 illustrates the system model
of a cooperative, distributive and de-centralized VANET. In VANET issues like response
time, data aging, bandwidth, packet delivery, message prioritization and communication
cost is a major concern. 
The sensors are embedded in the vehicles and surrounding transportation infrastruc-
ture. The node’s state can vary based on its energy level and environmental conditions. A
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cooperative network benefits the users with different wireless technologies and QoS. The
model shown below redirects the traffic to a parking lot using intelligent parking system
feature. Thus a collaborative approach is advantageous in situation like emergency evacu-
ation or traffic congestion.
 The primary task of the VANET is to aggregate and facilitate information to and from
all the neighboring vehicles for situation or threat assessment. Apart, from neighboring
vehicular information, other data sources like passenger interest, radio, satellite, traffic
management information can also be applied to improve the quality of information (QoI).
Although, VANET promises to solve shortcomings of current technology, DoS such as
jamming attack has become a major concern in these applications. 
Data communications between sensors and base station (BS) is triggered by a query.
These queries can be generated continuously, based on priority, time based or in an as
needed basis. A continuous query is deterministic and is targeted towards data from a
location or region of interest. During time sensitive or critical scenarios such as distress
signals or accidents, an event is triggered and given higher priority to be queried to BS or
nearby sensors to alert of oncoming traffic congestion or nearest healthcare facilities. Such
events are non-deterministic and are classified as priority queries. Timely queries are
made based on an individual’s interest during any pre-set time. For example, during busy
traffic hours and delays due to construction are obvious times when a critical message
may need to break through the heavy communication traffic. The need-based queries are
sent when any node or BS requires additional information for validation purposes. Upon
sensing any event, nodes are triggered to collect, fuse, and relay the messages to the desti-
nation.
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The sensor nodes are equipped with encryption techniques that ensures secure data
packets, but the control packets are vulnerable. Hence there are some assumptions made in
this application.
• Energy is not a concern in VANET
• Nodes are densely populated over the network
• Every node has the ability to store data of its interest for a time period ‘t’
• Data is communicated in discrete time frame, i.e., unusual speed, delay, etc
4.4.1 Experimental Network
A network with 25 nodes is considered in this simulation run with agents randomly
placed on the nodes. Figure 4.4 provides a pictorial description of the algorithm used in
VANET. The only input required by the agents are network parameters, the location of the
sensor and initial parameters for the C2SP. The number of agents is proportional to the
number of sensors in the network.
The network is built based on the following assumptions, such as, 
1. All nodes are initialized with varied energy level, thus giving each different capacity to 
transmit messages. 
2. Each node has varied threshold and their missions are varied.
3. The source and destination nodes are considered reliable.
4. Tolerance is set for every packet loss and successful packet delivery, beyond which, a 
node is penalized for it’s behavior and 
5.  The probabilistic approach of the agent depends on the latency and the percentage of 
false decision. The two factors need to be minimal.
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Figure 4.4. Flowchart - Detecting Jamming attack in VANET [70]
4.4.2 Simulated Attack Scenario
VANET is a densely deployed application, and hence jamming attack can be easily
launched. Also, the network cost and size are very dynamic. Any signal can be jammed by
a neighboring vehicle intentionally or unintentionally, but if the outcome leads to potential
threat to application then even the genuine user will be penalized. Also, the transmitted
message in VANET is encrypted and only packet size and timing can be manipulated by
jammers.
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Due to BN based knowledge, the factors such as BER, distance, latency, hops, node
reputation, packet delivery are constantly analyzed against the historical (training) data
set. The main advantage of VANET, is when multiple vehicles around the same vicinity
are encountered with attack a prolonged data loss can also indicate abnormal behavior. 
4.4.3 Simulated Results
The table below illustrates scenarios using different types of jammer and the effective-
ness of evolutionary algorithm in assessing the performance of the network. The proposed
detection and defense mechanism is simulated using Matlab. The performance of the net-
work can be evaluated based on 
1. Varying Jamming to signal ratio (J/S), 
2. Energy to jamming density ratio, 
3. energy to noise density ratio, 
4. multi-path interference,
The parameters of ant system are assumed to be = 4,  = 7, = .7, Q = 9 and initial
pheromone value, y as 10. The source and destination nodes were assumed reliable. The
stability of the algorithm is analyzed by iterating all scenarios for 100 runs. The actual
hops is user defined which varies depending on the problem assigned. The normalized
value of hops is given as HNorm. The predicted distance helps in making a decision
whether the nodes in the current route is still capable of communicating with its peers in
the next iteration.
 Figure 4.5 illustrates the BER for DSSS-BPSK model for image coefficients with
with three different priority levels. The normalized BER for high priority coefficients is
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given by red circles, the normalized BER for the medium priority coefficients is denoted
by yellow ‘+’ and the normalized BER for the low priority coefficients is denoted by
green ‘*’ symbols respectively. The BER achieved for high priority coefficients is much
less compared to messages of low priority coefficients. Using this analogy, a typical mes-
sage transmission between nodes during normal behavior can be modeled. 
Figure 4.5. Message Prioritization of co-efficients in Sensor based Application [71]
Table 4.1 shows the performance of the network where single tone jammer is applied.
Initially, the number of jammed node in a period t seconds is 3. Hence, the number of
nodes jammed is 3 out of 25 in the network. Similarly in each case nodes are jammed for t
seconds. Since single tone jammer affects only one carrier, and the modulation used here
is DS/FH, therefore the probability of finding the PN sequence by the jammer is low. The
performance of the network is based on the distance, latency and packet delivery. 
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 Table 4.2 shows the performance of the network when multiple tone jammer is applied.
In this type of jammer, all the carrier is jammed in a single node if its under attack. The
node recovers from the attack only after t seconds, so the chances of assuming the node
has either left the vicinity or data freshness criterion is not achieved.   
Table 4.2. Performance of Sensor Network -Multiple Tone Jammer
In Table 4.3 performance of the network when attacked by pulsed-noise jammer is
shown. In this case, the number of nodes under attack did not affect the network’s perfor-
mance. As the duty cycle of this jammer increases it’s signal strength only during the “on“
duration. Since the DS/FH modulation rarely falls in the duty cycle, even when 12 nodes
where under attack the network performance was fairly good. As shown, the pulsed-noise
jammer does not influence the performance of the network.
Table 4.3. Performance of Sensor Network -Pulsed-Noise Jammer
Table 4.1.  Performance of Sensor Network -Single Tone Jammer 
# node 
jammed
Average 
Distance
Average 
Latency
(sec)
Average 
Packet 
Delivery
3 9.756 1 97.349
6 24.205 6 95.2798
9 35.3302 8 69.3568
12 92.373 12 78.7423
# node 
jammed
Average 
Distance
Average 
Latency 
(sec)
Average 
Packet 
Delivery
3 4.937 4 99.230
6 5.920 6 98.410
9 20.203 18 92.938
12 94.297 18 60.239
# node 
jammed
Average 
Distance
Average 
Latency 
(sec)
Average 
Packet 
Delivery
3 1.202 7 99.008
6 2.45 13 99.129
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Table 4.4 shows the network performance when reactive jamming attacks the net-
work. Since reactive can disrupt the network based on the node’s signal detection. This
type of jammer affects the network performance very poorly. When 12 nodes are attacked
by reactive jammer, the network performance is degraded, but the jammer detection is
nearly 100%.
Table 4.4. Performance of Sensor Network -Reactive Jammer
As shown above, the latency of the network is not affected by the presence of a STJ
whereas reactive jammer easily reduces the performance of the application for both nar-
rowband and wideband technology. Due to the increased latency the data freshness feature
of the agents and system is affected and many node’s reputation is penalized until the jam-
mer’s location is detected. 
Finally, the most important feature of extending the learning feature of C2SP is to
locate the adversary. Table 4.5 shows the detection rate of the proposed framework
attained nearly 99% during reactive jammer attack but at the loss of application perfor-
mance. Whereas, detecting a multi-tone or pulse-tone jammer is about 85% and above. 
9 8.2093 19 98.2108
12 28.2928 29 78.9812
# node 
jammed
Average 
Distance
Average 
Latency 
(sec)
Average 
Packet 
Delivery
3 10.2921 10 82.1823
6 17.185 20 73.976
9 40.4931 31 40.209
12 70.0383 35 0.0034
# node 
jammed
Average 
Distance
Average 
Latency 
(sec)
Average 
Packet 
Delivery
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4. 5  Biometric Building Access Network
This research was inspired by the need for a flexible and cost effective biometric secu-
rity system. The flexibility of a wireless sensor network makes it a natural choice for data
transmission. Unlike human intelligence based face recognition, the computerized face
recognition using tiny inexpensive sensors with limited processing power and energy is a
challenging task. 3D faces are usually represented by 2D gray scale images or 2D RGB
color images. Whereas, the 2D facial images are affected by many factors such as lighting
conditions, poses, facial expressions, and age[ 72]. The desired biometric recognition sys-
tem should tolerate the intra-person variations while distinguishing the inter-person varia-
tions.
In temporarily enhanced security situations, a wireless constructed security system is
more flexible and cost effective by designing a communication network that adapts to the
environment and the sensors. 
Table 4.5. Jamming attack detection Using Bayesian based C2SP Approach
Type of 
Jammer
Attack 
Scenario
Detection 
Rate (%)
Reactive 
Jammer
10% 79
25% 83
50% 99
Multi-tone 
Jammer
10% 67
25% 77
50% 95
Pulse Tone 
Jammer
10% 77
25% 78
50% 90
Single Tone 
Jammer
10% 74
25% 80
50% 85
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A temporary face recognition system (FRS) can be set up easily by placing a camera
near the region of interest and transmitting the data through wireless channels to the pro-
cessing center placed at convenience. Data that is either the full image or representative
coefficients need to be transmitted with high fidelity to the remote processing center
where the face recognition database is stored. 
In [ 73], the robustness of wavelet transform to transmission loss is shown. Therefore,
the data in transmission is preferred to be the wavelet coefficients rather than the original
image. In this paper, the contourlet transform is experimentally shown to be able to further
decrease the mean square error from the wavelet transform, and their performance is tabu-
lated.
Figure 4.6 illustrates the routing of image coefficients to construct a robust face recog-
nition by a wireless sensor network. The message is transmitted from the start node,
denoted by a circle attached with a camera icon, to the destination node marked as “Data-
Base”. The active sensor nodes are denoted by dotted orange circles and inactive nodes are
denoted by blue circles with vertical stripes. The green lines show the actual route taken
by the swarm agent. The dotted red lines show the alternative route that the agent could
have taken. The agents travel through the route with less load, energy consumption, and
transmission error. The selected route is evident to be shorter and more efficient. The data
collected at the destination is processed and the acceptance or rejection decision is made. 
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Figure 4.6. Routing Image Co-efficients in Sensor Network
Within the camera sensor near the region of interest there's a small chip for image
compression and preliminary face tracking. The chip includes a small buffer to store the
raw image in case a finer raw image is needed later on. By discrete wavelet transform or
contourlet transform, a coarser image at a lower resolution can be produced to locate a
face with less computation resources and to transmit the coarse face to the face recogni-
tion system with less bandwidth and energy. Once the face recognition system determines
that there's a possible target, it will require the camera to send in the finer raw image and
scrutinize it in more detail. 
For data coding efficiency, the coarse scale image is derived by wavelet decomposi-
tion or contourlet transform. The coarser image is lossy by zeroing out the detailing coef-
ficients. If all coefficients are used in reconstruction, the reconstructed image is lossless.
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The bandwidth requirement increases from coarse scale to fine scale since the finer scale
image needs more nonzero coefficients to represent it. The detailing coefficients are usu-
ally very small and dense near zero; entropy coding is very efficient in representing them.
This improves the efficiency of transmitting the encoded coefficients describing the facial
details as well. This kind of architecture increases the speed, and efficiency with reduced
energy consumption and transmission error. In eigenface classification system, the basis
vectors are stored in the destination node to compare with the reconstructed face based on
received coefficients. If the transmission network can maintain the speed and efficiency of
the system, then the face recognition system is robust in nature. 
4.5.1 Experimental Network
In this application, the nodes use C2SP as their primary routing protocol and BN as the
database to support multiple image registration and enhance personnel identification.
There are 25 static wireless nodes, and 5 wired nodes, that participate in routing. The data
transmission is carried only in the wireless medium. Although biometric systems can be a
combination of image, voice, iris and fingerprinting, we primarily focus on face recogni-
tion aspect of the biometric system. Since, image co-efficients require additional transfor-
mation to deduce the information to co-efficients and hence computational and processing
cost needs to be considered in the application and algorithm design. 
Figure 4.7 illustrates the Bayesian network for detecting any types of DoS attack. The
performance metrics and the sensor’s characteristic is compared against to detect any
anomaly behavior and upon detection of the attack, the bayesian sets the threshold on the
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parameter’s settings. Hence, the constant update of threshold keeps the application adap-
tive based on the situation and mission of the application.
Figure 4.7. Bayesian Network for any DoS attack detection
4.5.2 Simulated Attack Scenario
In this chapter, we only simulated the jammer attack and hence, the VANET and Bio-
metric application both have sensitive data and are similar in many ways, the assumptions
of attack scenario is same in both cases. Except for biometric system, as its applied indoor
environment, the influence of shadowing etc is removed in data transmission but the data
itself undergoes high scrutiny due to the non-cooperative behavior of user’s. Due to the
availability of wired nodes with constant monitoring, a feedback on user’s behavior can
also be used as a feedback.
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4.5.3 Simulated Results
Figure 4.8 and Figure 4.9 show the performance of the biometric application where
low packet delivery rate of a node directly influences the % of correct acceptance and
refusal of the user i.e., an intruder could be given access to the building and a genuine user
could be deprived of his privileges, thus jeopardizing the application. Figure 4 and Figure
4.9 shows the impact of jammer attack on a biometric building access system. Thus an
influence of a jammer attack is primarily based on the type of jammer, which can be
avoided by knowing the characteristic and by predicting the attack.
Figure 4.8. Performance of Biometric system wrt PDR Vs. Prob of Correct Acceptance.
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Figure 4.9. Performance of biometric application wrt PDR Vs. Prob. of correct refusal
Table 4.6 gives the simulation results of different jammer attacks, where 12 nodes are
jammed out of 25 sensors in a network. The performance of the system is maintained
under single tone jammer, multi-tone jammer and pulse-noise jammer attacks. The agents
re-routes the messages and also with the help of the FHSS and DSSS techniques the sig-
nals are switched between channels. Unfortunately, a node under reactive jammer attack
has no such options, as the entire channel is under attack by means of a high power noise
signal spread along the spectrum. Thus for any application reactive jammer attack will
degrade the performance, and the only way for the sensor nodes to avoid reducing their
lifetime is by going to ‘idle’ mode.
Table 4.6.  Performance of WSN against jammer attacks
Type of attack Energy Depleted 
Average 
Packet Delivery 
Rate (PDR) (%)
Single Tone Jammer 50.0292 78.7423
Multi-Tone Jammer 97.392 60.239
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4. 6  Research Conclusion
The performance parameters such as hops, distance, packet loss, SNR, BER and
packet delivery influences the decision taken in anti-jamming techniques. The network
under 75% reactive jammer attack is shown to be functional indicating the robustness of
the C2SP. The four scenarios presented in the result section re-emphasize the fact that a
network remains functional and assesses the situation under all critical conditions. BN
applied an adaptive knowledge in assessing the situation, and detecting an attack. The
functionality of C2SP is to avoid jammed routes and find an effective countermeasure. 
The data sensitivity of the VANET and Biometric application is protected by encryp-
tion algorithms. In addition, only vehicles that are registered for on-road assistance and
smart-parking features can participate in message transmission. Hence, reducing the con-
gestion and also avoiding unwanted traffic to unwilling users. Whereas, in biometric
application, the sensitivity of the application requires users to be pre-registration of their
biometric information. 
Pulsed Noise Jam-
mer
31.920 78.9812
Reactive Jammer 70.0383 0.0038
Table 4.6.  Performance of WSN against jammer attacks
Type of attack Energy Depleted 
Average 
Packet Delivery 
Rate (PDR) (%)
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CHAPTER
FIVE
Intrusion Detection System
“Security comes from learning not one’s mistakes but from anticipating adversaries 
threat” 
In the last chapter, a bayesian based learning technique was used to detect adversary or
intruder’s location during an attack. In this chapter, the art of learning from the intruder is
explored. In recent years, Intrusion detection systems (IDS) have become widely popular
in wired and wireless link with many promising solutions. In sensor based applications,
there are many criterion that restricts the use of traditional IDS approaches. Hence, in this
chapter the final phase of the framework, an intruders behavior is learnt to improve the
robustness and security by exploring the use of a sensor network in a military application
such as battlefield deployment. 
5. 1  Intrusion Detection Framework
IDS is a process that was developed to ensure security of data and application by mon-
itoring for anomalies and reporting to the base station. Most IDS are designed with signa-
ture-based techniques. The IDS is trained with data to learn the normal traffic flow and to
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differentiate regular traffic from an impending attack. There are two possible ways of pro-
tecting the network, 
a) Intrusion detection (ID) framework and 
b) Countermeasure upon detecting an attack. 
There are many IDS and most of them are static, i.e., they can detect attacks using
existing templates. Hence, any new attacks can be left undetected otherwise require fre-
quent updates to keep application current. In addition, apriori modeled systems reduces
false positive results, and accurate attacker claims can be obtained.  
The primary features that makes any sensor based application successful are,
1. Secure and energy-efficient routing [17,  43]
2. Anomaly based detection
3. Improve accuracy of detection rate i.e., reduce false positive claims
4. Adaptive QoS features
5. Traffic Prioritization
There are different types of attackers, 1. Unintentional or amateur attacker 2. Knowl-
edge of the application and 3. Expert knowledge of the application protocols, require-
ments, and architecture.
The primary concern of IDS is designing the models as templates for identifying mali-
cious behavior. Also, there are numerous attacks that can evolve within a network i.e.,
insider and outsider attacks. The key feature of a successful IDS is not only to detect an
intrusion but also to recover the node from the intruder attack.
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5.1.1 Bait Architecture
The process of mimicking real-traffic to lead the adversary into gaining knowledge of
the network is called ‘bait’. In our application, sensors that are idle during routing are
termed as ‘bait’ nodes, i.e., upon detecting an anomaly the agents triggers these nodes to
have virtual communication with the attacked node. This action of virtual communication,
is dedicated to learn the intruder’s pattern. There are two types of ‘bait’, 
1. Low interaction, 
2. High interaction 
Low interaction ‘bait’ only involves neighboring nodes monitor for any anomalies. In
high interaction ‘bait’, a group of nodes with different coverage are used for predicting
future attacks using pattern recognition. The initialization cost, resources and time are the
two most important factors in determining the type of ‘bait’ for any application. The ‘bait’
nodes lures and acts as an accomplice to record intruder’s attack. Thus, learning from the
intruder enhances countermeasures and defense mechanisms.
Figure 5.1 illustrates the implementation of ID framework. The network comprises of
sensor with missions such as sensing, collecting, distributing information and acting as
‘bait’ nodes. When the information of the person or object of interest is flagged by the
agents, the data is communicated to the destination (database) node, where the decision of
whether its a normal activity (acceptance) or an intrusion (rejection) is made. Simultane-
ously, an intruder trying to gain access to the network is shown using 3 bold arrows. The
intruder tries to communicate to his/her neighboring nodes which are active, but seldom
does he know that his actions are been recorded and tracked at each ‘bait’ node using
agents.
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Figure 5.1. Framework implemented Using ‘Bait’ Architecture
The nature of agents sharing of local information with its neighbors can be strategi-
cally used to the user’s advantage to trap the intruder using ‘bait’ trails. Since the ‘bait’
nodes should not receive any traffic from genuine nodes any traffic can be considered
benevolent and removed using the tabu-list feature of agent. The agents use pheromone
deposition as the means of communication, the higher pheromone value relates to the
higher probability of route selection. This feature plays an important role in deceiving the
intruder by creating virtual values along the ‘bait’ network. Hence, an intruder who is
watching the traffic will assume everything is normal and end up attacking or probing the
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‘bait architecture’. Since C2SP is used as an optimization algorithm, the process of track-
ing the intruder while balancing the virtual and real resources and traffic prioritization is
possible.
5. 2  Battlefield Monitoring
Figure 5.2. Sensor based Battlefield Intrusion Detection System
Battlefield monitoring is an application that generates sensitive data. Figure 5.2 illus-
trates sensor network deployed in securing battlefield monitoring. There are two ways a
battlefield can be monitored. First, deploying sensors in a strategic manner where part of
the sensors can be used as ‘bait’ for intruders. Unfortunately, this requires good knowl-
edge of the environment. Secondly, deploying sensors at random, but initializing agents
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that mimics ‘bait’ trail for intruders. In the figure below, the sensors deployed in shaded
area are ‘bait’ sensors, where the message traffic is induced by the agents. Thus improving
the functionality of the sensors, while balancing the resources with no prior localization
knowledge.
The performance of the network is influenced by quality of data collected and pro-
cessed by sensor but also the amount of time required to be transmitted to base (destina-
tion). Hence, any false positive decision may jeopardize the lives of soldiers, innocent by-
standers or infrastructure. Battlefield monitoring system is initialized secretly by deploy-
ing sensors in a random manner using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). The primary task
of these heterogeneous sensors is to capture, track and relay messages to the base regard-
ing any movements of human or non-human objects. Sensors are deployed with overlap-
ping sensing coverage to collect correlated data thus ensuring reliable information under
individual node failure.
5.2.1 Experimental Network
A heterogeneous nodes of 50 wireless, 10 mobile and 5 wired nodes are deployed on a
two-dimensional (2D) grid. Among the 50 wireless nodes, 25 of them are ‘bait’ nodes and
the other 25 is called ‘normal’ nodes. Some of the assumptions on the network are as fol-
lows,
1. The wireless nodes have less power and computation cost.
2. Nodes have unique identity and are aware of ‘bait’ node existence.
3. ‘Normal’ nodes can be non-cooperative in nature.
4. No genuine traffic exist between ‘bait’ and ‘normal’ nodes.
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The performance metrics such as hops, distance, BER, route, energy, latency and PDR
are all recorded in the tabu-list and is communicated to the base station. 
5.2.2 Simulated Attack Scenario
The training data consist of the different DoS attack such as Jamming, Sybil and
Wormhole. The initial traffic is set by the base station, beyond which an unsupervised
control is given to the nodes to identify any attacks.
1. ‘Bait’ nodes are cooperative in nature.
2. ‘Bait’ nodes are strictly relay nodes and the traffic is initiated by a base station.
3. ‘Bait’ nodes has same resource constraints as ‘normal’ nodes.
4. Upon detecting a traffic from illegitimate node, the ‘bait’ nodes alerts its neighboring 
nodes to participate in routing.
5. ‘Insider’ attacks refers to ‘normal’ nodes under malicious attack and ‘Outsider’ attacks 
refers to illegitimate nodes attacking either the ‘bait’ or ‘normal’ nodes.
The number of ‘normal’ and ‘bait’ nodes are kept the same to ensure fairness in detect-
ing threats. The IDS and Bayesian network robustness is tested in environment where
three new attacks such as sinkhole, black hole and misdirection. 
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Figure 5.3. Sinkhole attack in Sensor based Network
As shown in Figure 5.3 in a Sinkhole attack, the malicious node advertises as the route
with the high quality, and can spoof its neighboring nodes. Also, a sinkhole node can act
like a wormhole node, by replaying message at the other end and falsely claim that it has
direct connection to the base station.
In misdirection attack, the ‘malicious’ node corrupts the data packets that is forwarded
during data transmission. Due to the route tampering, the malicious node easily re-routes
data flow, thus affecting system performance and also security of data itself is jeopar-
dized. In a Black hole attack, the malicious node advertises high energy ability to its
neighbors and participates in relaying information. 
In an ‘active’ DoS attack the malicious node actively participates in attacking the
neighboring nodes to degrade the network performance, whereas in ‘passive’ attack, the
illegitimate node attacks the route without participating often, thus reducing the probabil-
ity of being detected by intelligent algorithm. 
5.2.3 Simulated Results
The attack identified by the ‘bait’ architecture below is sinkhole where the attacker
advertises with high QoS and best route to actively participate as relay node. The attack
data set for Bayesian network is trained as shown in Figure 5.4. Under a sybil attack, the
node (1,2) pretends dual personality as (2,1) and (3,4). In the first route, the SI algorithm is
tricked in believing that (1,2) is a reliable node since there is a communication delay in
detecting the DoS attack. Whereas in the next subplot the algorithm responds immediately
to the attack and excludes the compromised node from its route, thus maintaining the effi-
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ciency of the network. The performance parameters have a direct impact in identifying if
the node is under DoS attack. By using the negative packet delivery weight, the malicious
node can be removed from the route.
Figure 5.4. Training ‘Sybil’ and ‘Wormhole’ data set for Bayesian Network
The computation cost is an important feature to consider while evaluating the ‘bait’
architecture. 
Figure 5.5 shows the detection rate of a sink hole attack is above 80%, which could be
due to the fact that the model was trained with wormhole attack.
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Figure 5.5. Detection of Sinkhole attack using ‘Bait’ Architecture
In the black hole attack, the illegitimate node advertises to have high energy and
attracts traffic and can has been easily detected using the ‘bait’ architecture as shown in
Figure 5.6. The detection rate of the passive black hole attack is also lower when com-
pared to the active black hole attack. 
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Figure 5.6. Detection of Black hole attack Using Bait Architecture
Finally, the misdirection attack that commonly happens in any distance or geographi-
cal based routing protocols such as Ad-hoc On demand Distance Vector (AODV), DSR
etc. In this attack, a malicious node adds on fake route when updating the table, which
leads the neighboring nodes to exhaust its resources. 
Figure 5.7 shows the detection rate of the misdirection attack, and its evident that apart
from a combined knowledge of the bait architecture and the robustness of the C2SP aids in
identifying a discrepancy in route. As the C2SP’s transition probability depends not only
on a route but also on other performance factors. Thus, designing a secure protocol lies in
understanding the performance metrics and application constraints. 
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Figure 5.7. Misdirection Attack Using Bait Architecture
Figure 5.8 illustrates the performance of the two approaches, ‘bayesian’ based C2SP
represented in ‘triangles’ and ‘bait’ based IDS, represented with ‘+’. The ROC curve gives
the sensitivity of the application with the detection rate of the application under intruder
attack. In the simulation, a jammer and wormhole attack was combined to analyze the per-
formance of the different approaches. The Bayesian based model was trained with data set
consisting of individual DoS attack such as Sybil, Wormhole and Jammer whereas the
IDS was only exposed to wormhole DoS attack scenario. The models had different thresh-
old settings throughout the simulations to enhance their learning feature. The approaches
were able to detect about 90% and above for unknown DoS attack scenarios.   
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Figure 5.8. Performance Comparison Using ROC curve for Bayesian and Bait based 
Approach for a combined DoS attack
The successful identification of a malicious node in a combined DoS attack using
‘bait’ architecture is given in Figure 5.9. It is important to note that if the increased num-
ber of node is attacked the identification of the malicious node is down to 70% whereas,
for a minimal number of attack, the identification of illegitimate node is close to 100%. A
intruder system works best if a balance between a false positive and false-negative rate is
found. In addition, if the sink node is at the farthest end of the network, chances of a ille-
gitimate node is higher as the number of hops and multipath is increased and so is the vul-
nerability of the route.
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Figure 5.9. Successful Identification of Combined DoS attack Using ‘Bait’ Architecture
The performance of bayesian based C2SP approach and ‘bait’ based IDS architecture
depend primarily on the application’s resource availability and sensitivity. In order to
achieve maximum security in critical applications such as battlefield deployment, other
application where nations natural resources such as Smart Grid, Border security, Smart-
care etc., require protection a ‘bait’ architecture is best suited. For applications such as
Habitat Monitoring, etc a Bayesian model is a best fit. Also, the increased sensitivity of
the application means there are some inconvenience caused to the user (customer) that
needs to be tolerated for the sake of security.
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5. 3  Research Conclusion
In this chapter, the importance of an IDS for sensor network is analyzed. The addition
of ‘bait’ nodes with a feature to mimic traffic gives insight of adversary’s mission to
attack the network. 
The ‘bait’ architecture was able to predict any new DoS attack such as Sink hole,
Black hole and Misdirection. The ‘bait’ architecture’s detection rate is directly propor-
tional to the learning data set provided and the performance metrics. Battlefield monitor-
ing application was assumed to have abundant resources and hence high-interaction ‘bait’
architecture was assumed. For time sensitive or high priority applications such as Health-
monitoring, Emergency Responder etc., deploying ‘bait’ nodes are not feasible. In such
scenarios, ‘super’ nodes with additional computation power can be deployed i.e., Smart
home devices can actively participate in predicting an abnormal behavior. 
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CHAPTER
SIX
Conclusion and Future Work
“Research is a cup that never runs over” 
The chapter gives a brief description on the contributions made in this dissertation.
The research direction can be further explored and possible extensions can be made for
future research.
6. 1  Research Conclusion and Contributions
Sensors have become predominant in our day-to-day lives, where one can start a day
with sensor equipped shoes to securing the borders of a nation using unsupervised nodes.
Therefore, it is imperative that security must be considered during the design phase of any
technology. Security schemes should be tailored to each application based on its resource
availability and performance. My contribution to this research is as follows, 
Background on the research in the field of sensor security in both academia and indus-
try are discussed. An overview of all the research contributions in securing the different
aspects of the sensor network are analyzed. In addition, the need for achieving security by
applying simple design techniques considering performance metrics and environmental
settings. There are many research work in sensor security, but detection, prediction and
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countermeasure for a combined DoS attack is not been explored using a cognitive
approach and evaluated under different simulated scenarios. Henceforth, to date this
research work is considered state-of-the-art in the field of swarm intelligence and hetero-
geneous sensor network
The major contribution of this dissertation is a three-fold framework that cognitively
adapts its performance based on the situation and application requirements. The different
types of denial-of-service attacks that can jeopardize an application is carefully considered
and countermeasures are implemented. The fundamentals of swarm intelligence and fea-
tures of the ant colony optimization algorithm are combined to form a security protocol. In
addition, the security protocol is tailored for a wide variety of applications by weighing
the performance parameters using mathematical concepts called partially ordered sets.
Applications such as Emergency Responder and Health-care monitoring were simulated
with scenarios similar to threats faced in the real world. The robustness and reliability of
the C2SP is justified with the countermeasure solutions obtained where optimal resources
such as energy, distance, hops are achieved while improving the quality of service and
application performance. 
In the second phase of the cognitive framework the learning feature of the agents is
further enhanced using inference made by Bayesian models. Among all the other denial-
of-service attacks, a jamming attack on the physical layer is considered most vulnerable
and hence, detecting the same is crucial for the application. The jammer types are dis-
cussed and appropriate metrics are determined to detect abnormal behavior in sensor
nodes. A good training data set for Bayesian models help detect a jammer with more accu-
racy, and hence application such as vehicular ad-hoc network is best suited. In addition,
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due to the dense deployment of nodes, and multiple monitors further improve the accuracy
of jammer detection. Also an approximate location of the jammer can be obtained using
the affected nodes is the area.
Finally, the third phase of the security framework is when the application requires
utmost security against threats and has the resources to learn the attacker’s interest about
the application and data. The ‘bait’ architecture mimics normal traffic to gain adversary,
and dedicated nodes are deployed for this purpose. The extended architecture successfully
identifies new denial-of-service attacks but with a high cost. Hence, battlefield application
where national security could afford the resources is considered. The pattern learnt from
an adversary depends on the type of ’bait’ architecture used. Thus, the three fold cognitive
framework balances between defending, and detecting a threat to the network based on the
application constraints and performance requirements. 
Chapter 2 analyses the different active research performed in the field of security. In
Chapter 3, a detailed background on the security such as data, network and application
was discussed. And the different approaches taken by researchers to defend the network
was explained. Chapter 4 gives a overview of the evolutionary algorithm, and its role in
C2SP. In addition, the weights on performance metrics is applied to obtain mission-criti-
cal optimal solutions using POSets. The learning feature of the C2SP is further explored
using Bayesian network to detect a threat and locate its origin in Chapter 5. The final
phase of the proposed cognitive framework, where a ‘bait’ architecture to predict future
attacks is discussed in Chapter 6. In each of the chapters, an application that exist in real-
world is analyzed and simulated to justify the proposed framework’s reliability, robust-
ness and versatility. In addition, the cognitive framework is not only adaptive to the differ-
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ent security threats but also to any application formulated. The best feature of the
proposed framework, is the ability to learn from its environment and also to refine its solu-
tions by adapting to the application requirements and constraints. 
The proposed novel framework controls heterogeneous sensor network requirements,
and balance the resources optimally and efficiently while communicating securely using a
multi-objection function. In addition, the framework can measure the affect of single or
combined denial of service attacks and also predict new attacks under both cooperative
and non-cooperative sensor nodes. The cognitive intuition of the framework is evaluated
under different simulated real time scenarios such as Health-care monitoring, Emergency
Responder, VANET, Biometric security access system, and Battlefield monitoring.
6. 2   Future Work
The contribution for the security in sensor network are as follows 
1. Countermeasure for denial-of-service attack, 
2. Detecting a denial-of-service attack, 
3. Predicting ‘new’ denial-of-service attack and 
4. Cross-Layered Cognitive Security Protocol. 
Hence, the future research direction in these three sections are as follows,
6.2.1 Countermeasure Against DoS attack
Chapter 3 discusses countermeasure against DoS attack in both sensor based health-
care monitoring and emergency responder application. Although, the application here is
assumed to have location information, in reality people originating from rural and subur-
ban have different types of connectivity to the web. Hence, not all devices can be con-
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nected to the network and an accurate location information is close to impossible, and so is
the time synchronization of information among nodes. The source and sink nodes where
always considered secure, and a cooperative nature within the network is observed, which
needs to be extended to insider attacks. 
6.2.2 Detecting of DoS attack
The detection of DoS attack was analyzed assuming a complete knowledge of the
intruder and application. In many cases, an unpredictable node behavior is caused by envi-
ronment and most sensor nodes are applied in remote areas where monitoring their condi-
tions is not feasible. Hence, a minimally trained bayesian network with the ability to learn
from its past using feature extraction can be further explored. Also, the location of a jam-
mer is an interesting idea, but a centroid location based on neighboring DoS attacked
nodes will result in very high false positives. As nodes involved in DoS claims can be
from illegitimate and genuine nodes, and hence an extensive method of locating jammer
not only based on claims but also mathematical models would increase location detection
accuracy.
6.2.3 Predicting DoS attacks
The process of adding ‘bait’ architecture for resource available networks restricts the
safety of resource constrained networks. Hence, the nodes can rather have different func-
tionality and switch modes in either being a relay, source, sink or ‘bait’ nodes based on the
situation assessment. Also, the current framework helps in predicting new DoS attacks,
which can be further extended to predicting data, network and application security attacks. 
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6.2.4 Cross-Layered Cognitive Security Protocol
The C2SP approach consist of concepts from ant colony optimization (ACO) and par-
tially ordered sets (POSets), together with a layered feature of network model. The generic
structure of C2SP can be modeled independent of any application. In essence, by adding
more features to the C2SP, the characteristics such as de-centralization, unsupervised,
reachability, reliability, versatility and robustness should be maintained. Security threats
are constantly evolving so the exploratory behavior of agents must adapt and evolve in
accordance. A balance of exploration and exploitation is the key for cognitive intelligence. 
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